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We discuss a simple model in which parents and children make investments in the children’s 
education, investments for other purposes, and parents can transfer cash to their children.  We 
show that for an identifiable set of parent-child pairs, parents will rationally under-invest in their 
child’s education.  For these parent-child pairs, additional financial aid will increase educational 
attainment.  The model highlights an important feature of higher education finance, the 
“expected family contribution” (EFC) that is based on income, assets, and other factors.  The 
EFC is neither legally guaranteed nor universally offered:  Our model identifies the set of 
families that are disproportionately likely to not provide their full EFC.  Using a common proxy 
for financial aid, we show, in data from the Health and Retirement Study, that financial aid 
increases the educational attainment of children whose families are disproportionately likely to 
under-invest in education.  Financial aid has no effect on the educational attainment of children 
in other families.  The theory and empirical evidence identifies a set of children who face 




  There has been long-standing interest in whether U.S. students have access to sufficient 
resources to support efficient human capital investment (see, for example, Becker, 1967).  But 
despite a large literature, no paper on borrowing constraints for higher education focuses on the 
family’s role in financing college, particularly through their expected family contribution (EFC).  
The EFC is the difference between a child’s cost of attending college and what the federal 
financial aid formulas determine is the family’s “adjusted available income” for college.  The 
EFC, however, is neither legally guaranteed nor universally offered.  Children whose parents for 
one reason or another refuse or are unable to make their EFC may face financial constraints in 
attending college.
1 
  The detailed data that are needed to examine the family’s role in financing college, namely 
on parental income, assets, demographic factors, and the contributions parents actually make for 
college, are scarce.  Moreover, the EFC is determined, in part, by the college that children attend.  
Consequently, the EFC is endogenous to the outcomes, namely college entry or years of 
completed education, that are of typical interest to researchers.  Even if an arguably exogenous 
EFC measure could be computed, borrowing constraints may have their most important effects 
on the decision of whether or not a child goes to college.  For a child who ends up not going to 
college, the parent will clearly not provide college expenses.  So the counterfactual – what the 
parent would have contributed had the child gone to college – is unobserved.  This unobserved 
counterfactual makes it difficult to examine directly the effect of parents’ education transfers on 
educational attainment. 
                                                 
1 Diana, posting on 1/11/2005 to the Becker-Posner Blog, writes, “…Currently if you are under 25 and not in 
graduate school you are considered dependent on your parents’ income and have to include their income on your 
FAFSA which will count against you when figuring your expected family contribution.  For those of us who did not 
receive any financial support from parents other than cosigning loans this is a real kick in the ass.  Not only is my 
family lower middle class and unable to contribute to my education, but the government will tell me that they 
expected them to contribute and will punish me by lowering my available loan total” (http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/2005/01/governments-role-in-student-loans-becker.html#comments).  
  2
   In this paper we introduce a new approach to studying borrowing constraints and higher 
education.  Our starting point is the observation that parents and children are distinct decision-
makers.  Specifically, in our model we assume parents face complete credit markets and they 
care about their own consumption and about the well-being of their adult child.  We assume a 
child cannot borrow against future earnings and they care only about their own consumption (and 
not their parent’s).  We show the child’s education may be suboptimal due to borrowing 
constraints.  The parent may be poor relative to the child or care too little about the utility of their 
child to provide financial help for college, since parents cannot access the returns to their child’s 
education.  Alternatively parents and children may disagree about the optimal investment in 
education because of the possibility that the child will end up relying too heavily on the parent. 
  There are two regions in the equilibrium of our model.  One region is distinguished by the 
presence of post-schooling cash transfers (and parents are relatively wealthy, or altruistic, or the 
child’s ability is relatively modest).  In this portion of the equilibrium, children achieve the 
efficient level of investment in education, so the return to education equals the financial market 
rate of return.  There are strategic concerns, however, so the parent “ties” a portion of their 
intergenerational transfers by purchasing education for the child.  The other region is 
distinguished by no post-schooling cash transfers (and parents are relatively poor, or egoistic, or 
the child is relatively able).  In this portion of the equilibrium, there will be underinvestment in 
the child’s education, so the return to additional human capital investment will exceed the 
financial market rate of return.  It is precisely this group of parents that will rationally not meet 
their EFC.  Parents will tolerate this inefficiency because they have no way to write a binding 
contract to ensure that some portion of the child’s future earnings will be repaid in return for 
supporting their child’s education.    
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  Financial aid will have sharply different effects on parent-child pairs in the two regions of 
the model’s equilibrium.  For parents who make post-college transfers, additional financial aid 
should have no effect on educational attainment, because parents will already make the efficient 
level of investment in their child’s education.  But children of parents who do not make post-
college transfers under-invest in education, due in part to their inability to borrow against future 
earnings.  For these children, increases in financial aid will increase educational attainment.   
  For expositional clarity, our model abstracts away from important considerations both in 
parent-child relations and in higher education finance.  Among the most important is the fact that 
a child’s post-college earnings are uncertain, which may affect post-college transfers, and the 
fact that some children finance college by working while in school or by extending the amount of 
time they attend college.  We extend the model to address these concerns in an appendix and 
show that the central intuition still holds:  financial aid should be more likely to affect the 
educational attainment of children whose parents do not make post-college transfers than 
children whose parents do make post-college transfers. 
  Examining the empirical implications of the model requires data on three things:  parent-
child pairs, financial aid, and intergenerational transfers, ideally for a substantial period 
following college so we can separate parent-child pairs into those parents who do and those who 
do not make post-college transfers.  No dataset has all three features.  The Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS) comes close, with good data on parent-child pairs and intergenerational transfers 
over a long period.  The HRS also offers a good proxy for financial aid.  The dollar amount of 
financial aid will depend on the overlap of a child’s college years with those of his or her 
siblings.  As a result, we rely on the birth spacing of siblings as a proxy for variation in students’ 
federal aid.   
  4
  As implied by our analytic model, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between educational attainment and sibling overlap when no post-schooling cash transfers are 
reported, and no significant relationship when positive transfers are reported.  Our primary 
empirical model is based on variation in birth spacing among children within the same family 
and our results are consistent across many alternative specifications.  The magnitude of the 
association implies a difference in educational attainment of 0.4 years of schooling between a 
constrained child with four years of sibling overlap relative to a child with no sibling overlap 
while in college.  A child with 4 years of sibling overlap while in college would receive, on 
average, about $3,600 more in financial aid (in 2009 dollars) over 4 years than an otherwise 
equivalent child with no years of sibling overlap.  About half of the children in the sample are 
potentially constrained.  This implies that $3,600 in additional financial aid would result in 0.2 
additional years of schooling for the sample, on average.  Borrowing constraints for higher 
education appear to be important for children in families where parents are unwilling or are 
unable to meet their expected family contribution.   
I.  A model of intergenerational transfers 
  The starting point for our model is the small theoretical literature on collective family 
schooling decisions.
2  To generate an equilibrium that distinguishes between education and cash 
transfers and the timing of these, there must be scope for disagreement between parents and 
children over children’s investments.  Repeated transfer opportunities can generate a threat of 
strategic over-reliance of a child on an altruistic parent.  The possibility of strategic behavior by 
                                                 
2 When studies of borrowing constraints for education include analytic models, they invariably assume that families 
make unitary college decisions based on parents’ resources and children’s ability.  Two interesting papers that do 
not examine borrowing constraints but do investigate behavioral consequences of parental transfers to school-age 
children are Sauer (2003) and Perozek (2005).  Sauer examines the effects of parental transfers during law school on 
borrowing, work while in school, and post-school earnings for a sample of University of Michigan law school 
graduates.  Perozek characterizes altruistic transfer rules in a dynamic setting and empirically explores the education 
investments of a parent and multiple children using the HRS.  
  5
children may lead parents to tie transfers in the form of education or, as we discuss in our model, 
to under-invest in education, given that the parent cannot access the returns from the child’s 
education.
3 
a.  The Economic Environment   
  Consider a two-period model where parents care about their children’s utility.  We assume 
that parents and children make independent, non-cooperative decisions.
4  In particular, the parent 
moves first, choosing his or her consumption and physical capital investment, along with the 
dollar amounts of a cash transfer to the child and a tied transfer for college education.  The child 
sees these choices and then decides how much to consume, invest in schooling, and save.  In the 
second period, the parent again consumes and chooses a cash gift to the child; the child’s only 
action is to consume the gift and the returns to his or her various investments.  While the parent 
has full access to credit, we assume that the child cannot borrow against his or her future 
                                                 
3 The Samaritan’s Dilemma, evident here in the possibility of the child’s over-reliance on the parent, was first 
described by Buchanan (1975), and results on the Samaritan’s Dilemma in Lindbeck and Weibull (1988), Bergstrom 
(1989), and Bruce and Waldman (1990) have shaped our approach.  Bruce and Waldman (1991) are the first to 
connect the Samaritan’s Dilemma to the motive for tied transfers.  Pollak (1988) uses preferences for education to 
motivate parents’ investments, and observes that distinctions among transfer forms must rely on a disagreement 
between parents and children and that effective tied transfers cannot function as collateral or be resold. 
4 Noncooperation is a critical assumption of our work.  Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1992) reject income pooling, 
an implication of both the unitary model and the non-cooperative model with active financial linkages, for extended 
families.  In Brown, Mazzocco, Scholz and Seshadri (2006), we argue that the Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff 
income pooling result allows one to reject not only non-cooperative behavior with active financial linkages, but also 
the standard cooperative model under income-independent Pareto weights.  In our 2006 paper, we repeat their test 
using data on independent parent and child households only, and like the earlier work, we also reject income 
pooling.  The rejection of income pooling is consistent with non-cooperative interactions and inactive financial 
linkages that characterize our modeling approach.   
      An implication of our model of one-sided altruism is that there will be no child-to-parent transfers.  The 
empirical literature suggests that child-to-parent transfers are uncommon and small relative to either parent-to-child 
transfers or transfer support for college education.  Gale and Scholz (1994), for example, look at transfer patterns in 
the 1986 Survey of Consumer Finances.  They find that 83.6 percent of total recipient-reported transfers are from 
parents, while only 3.1 percent of total recipient-reported transfers are from children.  Further, the annual flow of 
transfer support to parents that they infer from the data is roughly a tenth of the annual flow of support to children or 
the annual flow of transfers for college education.  When transfers are given from younger to older generations, it is 
typically done when parents are elderly, but even then it is fairly uncommon.  McGarry and Schoeni (1995), for 
example, find that 6.7 percent of 51-61 year old HRS respondents in 1992 report gifts to parents, while 29 percent 




 Define  a as the total parent and child investment in physical capital, and define e as their 
total investment in the child’s postsecondary education.  Assume that the rate of return on 
physical capital is constant at R and the return to total human capital investment e is h(e) such 
that  () 0 , () 0  a nd (0) . hh h R ′′ ′ ′ ⋅> ⋅< >   A child can receive financial aid τ , which augments 
family human capital investments.  Total human capital investment  ( , )







∂+∂ > , where superscript p identifies parents and superscript k  identifies children.  
We also assume that  (( 0 ,) ) he R τ ′ ≥ .  In the course of our analysis we consider two particular 
descriptions of financial aid.  In the first, aid functions as a price subsidy, so that 
(1 )( )
pk ee e τ =+ + :  the marginal dollar invested in education has a return of (1 ). τ +   The 
analogy we have in mind is to the practical case where the marginal dollar a family invests is 
leveraged though federal subsidized loan programs, such as guaranteed student loans.  In the 
second, aid is given as a lump sum transfer, so that 
pk ee e τ = ++ .  The analogy we have in 
mind is to all cases in which aid is inframarginal.  This occurs, for example, when a family 
receives a Pell grant or subsidized loan, but the grant or loan is less than total  , e  so the last dollar 
spent on education is wholly out-of-pocket. 
  The child and parent utilities are given by 
  ()
12 1 2
12 12 1 2 1 2
(,) () ()  a n d
( , , , ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ,
kkk k k
pppkk p p k k
Ucc u c u c






                                                 
5 As discussed in Brown et al. (2006), both assumptions that we make – non-cooperative behavior and children have 
more limited ability to borrow than parents – are necessary to obtain empirical predictions on the timing and 




t c  represents the period t consumption of agent j, α  expresses the parent’s degree of 
purely altruistic concern for the child’s welfare, and β  is the rate at which each agent discounts 
future utility.  Single period utility of consumption for each agent,  () u ⋅ , is such that 
() 0, ( ) 0  and (0) . uu u ′′ ′ ′ ⋅> ⋅< = + ∞  
  The parent acts as a Stackleberg leader, moving first in period 1, choosing 
1 ,   (assets), 
p pp ca e  and first period transfer to the child,  1, g  subject to constraints 
11 1 , 0
ppp p caegx g +++≤ ≥  and  0.
p e ≥
6  As a result of the one-sided altruism and non-
cooperative interaction between the parent and child, the parent is unable to draw resources from 
the child through a negative transfer or through negative investment in the child’s education.  
The non-negativity of parental cash transfers in the second period will play a crucial role in 
determining equilibrium investments. 
  The child takes the parent’s choices of  1 , 
p p ca  and 
p e as given, choosing  1 ,   and 
kk k ca e  
subject to constraints  11 ,
kkk caeg ++≤  0
k e ≥  and  0
k a ≥ .  In the second period, the parent 
determines consumption  2
p c  and the amount of the second period cash transfer to the child,  2, g  
subject to constraints  22 2 and 0.
pp cgR a g +≤ ≥   The child consumes his or her total resources, 
so that  22 () .
kk cR ah e g =++  
b.  Period 2 
  The parent’s problem in the second period is 
                                                 
6 The assumption that   (0) u′ =+ ∞, combined with the child’s zero endowment, implies that  1 0 g ≥  does not bind at 
the parent’s optimum;   0
p e ≥ , however, may bind.  Key results in this paper hold even when the child has an 
endowment that can support first period consumption (Brown et al., 2006). 
      
p e  is the parent’s optimal expenditure on education, which will depend on income, altruism, and the shape of 
the child’s human capital production function, among other factors.  The EFC, in contrast, is an important 
determinant of the aid that a child will receive but it is not the optimal family educational expenditure.    
  8
  { } 22
0 2
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 such that  ( ) ( ( ) )
( , ( ))            where  ( ) ( ( )),
0   otherwise.
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gu R a g u R a h e g
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α
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When the transfer that equates second period marginal utilities across generations is positive, the 
parent achieves his/her preferred allocation of the family’s total final-stage resources.
7  The 
parent’s altruism toward the child implies that the final transfer decreases with the child’s assets 
and earnings, no matter what choices preceded them, so second period transfers, when made, are 
compensatory.  The key point of equation (1) for our purposes, however, is that when the 
parent’s marginal utility from consuming everything in period 2 exceeds the marginal utility they 
would get from the first dollar of cash transfers, the parent will not make second period transfers.  
Whether or not second period cash transfers are made distinguishes the two segments of the 
equilibrium. 
c.  Period 1:  Child 
  In the first period, the child determines his or her own consumption, saving, and educational 
investment given the  1 (,  ,  )
p p ga e chosen by the parent.  The child’s problem is 
{ } 12





..    ,
        ( ) ( , ( )),
        ( , ( )) as in (1) and  ( , ).
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7 This surprisingly robust prediction is the focus of the theory and empirical analysis in Altonji, Hayashi and 
Kotlikoff (1997).   
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The function  2(,  ( ) )
pk gR a R a h e +  is continuous but non-differentiable where 
(( ) ) ( )
kp uR a h e uR a α ′′ += .  
   The first order conditions for the child’s problem make it clear that whenever  2 0 g > , the 
child would like to over-consume in the first period in order to achieve consumption path 
12 {,}
kk cc such that 
                  { }
2
12 () (( ) )
() m a x ,( ) 1 ()
g kk e
pk k ee R ah e
uc R he uc β
∂ ∂
∂+ ∂ +
⎛⎞ ′′ ′ =+ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
.                                (2) 
Since the second period gift described by (1) compensates the child for low post-schooling 







∂+  is negative.  Hence equation (2) indicates that the child 
would like to exploit their parent’s altruism by consuming more in the first period and less in the 
second relative to the standard intertemporal consumption smoothing condition. 
{ } 12 ()
() m a x ,( ) ()
kk e
pk ee
uc R he uc β ∂
∂+
′′ ′ = .  The consumption profile satisfying equation (2) extracts 
a greater post-schooling gift from the parent in the event that  2 0 g > .  The child’s preferred 
consumption profile will be possible only if there exists an  0
k e ≥  and  0
k a ≥  satisfying (2), 
given the parent’s choices.  We show in Appendix A, the parent will choose  1,   and 
pp ge a  such 
that 0  and 0
kk ea ≥≥  bind, thus eliminating the strategic concern (and equation (2) ends up not 
holding in the  2 0 g > case).   
d.  Period 1:  Parent 
  In period 1, the parent chooses  11 , ,    and 
p pp cg e a  to maximize his or her utility, subject to 
11 1 , 0  and 0.
ppp p p caegx g e +++≤ ≥ ≥   We note three features of the model in proposition 1.
8 
                                                 
8 Proofs of both propositions are given in Appendix A.  
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Proposition 1: (i) Equilibrium consumption levels  12 12 {,,,}
p pkk cccc are unique. (ii) If  2 0 g >  in 






′ =  and the equilibrium transfers  12 (,,)
p egg are unique. (iii) 






′ >  – there is inefficient investment in 
education from the family’s point of view – and the equilibrium transfers need not be unique, 
since only the sum,  1
p ge + , is determined. 
 






′ = .  The parent’s  11 , ,    and 
p pp cg e a  meet conditions  
 
11 1 2 22 ()
11 1 1 2 2 2 2
() () ,  () () ,  ( ) ,   a n d  () () ,
where ,  ,  ,  =0  and  ( ( , )) .
pk p p pk e
pk ee
pp pp k p p k k p
uc uc uc R uc he R uc uc





′′ ′ ′ ′ ′′ == = =
=− −− = = − = +
(3)
9 
The solution will be in this region when parents are relatively wealthy, or altruistic, or the child’s 
return to human capital investment falls relatively quickly to the real interest rate.  
 In  the  2 0 g >  equilibrium strategic concerns arise so the parent bears all responsibility for 
the investment in the child’s education.  The child realizes that the parent will be in the interior 
of the transfer region in the second period.  Hence, given the opportunity, the child would over-
consume in the first period, as shown in equation (2).  The parent takes this into account and 
makes a cash gift of only what she prefers for the child to consume in the first period.  The 
parent ties all additional first period transfers to education, exhausting the region of educational 
investment that yields a return at or above the real interest rate.  Should the parent prefer to claim 
some part of the return to education for herself, she can easily accomplish this by withholding a 
portion of intended post-schooling transfers.  To summarize, we find that families in the  2 0 g >  
                                                 
9 Note that the fact that  0
k e =  in the 
2 0 g >  case arises as a product of the equilibrium. The parent’s first period 
choices in the 
2 0 g >  case cause the  0
k e ≥  constraint to bind, avoiding the strategic over-consumption by the child 
reflected in equation (2).   
 11
equilibrium face strategic concerns, yet they make efficient educational investments and hence 
they relieve the child’s educational borrowing constraint. 
  The other region of the parameter space occurs where conditions (3) can be met only with 







10  The equilibrium is described by 
 
11 1 2 22 ()
12 1 1 ()
11 2 2
() () ,  () () ,    ( ) ,  () () ,
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 (4) 
 
The absence of a second period transfer means that the child has no incentive to behave 
strategically.  As a result, the parent and child agree on the intertemporal condition to be met by 
the child’s consumption:  12 ()
() ( ) ()
kk e
pk ee
uc he uc β ∂
∂+
′′ ′ = .   
 The  2 0 g =  equilibrium is inefficient from the family’s perspective.  The post-schooling 
consumption that the parent prefers to allocate to the child is less than the earnings produced by 
the efficient human capital investment.  In other words, conditions (4) imply 
*
2 ()
k ch e < , where 
* e  is the amount of education investment that would make 
*




∂+ = .  If the parent could 
write a binding contract requiring that the child repay the share of the returns to education 
necessary to achieve the parent’s preferred 
*
2 ()
k ch e < , then, given his or her full access to credit, 
the parent would fund the efficient educational investment.  However, parents cannot write such 
contracts.
11  Since parents cannot reclaim the return to 
p e  invested in the child’s education, they 
                                                 








′ = .  
But given incomes, altruism and other model parameters, this case has no consequence for our empirical work. 
11 There are two justifications for this assumption.  First, children under 18 cannot enter into binding contracts.  
Second, because of the assumed power differential between parents and children and possible concerns about 
practices that may be “contrary to public policy” in the U.S., even if a contract existed, disputes over the contract  
 12
invest in human capital to support the child’s second period consumption but physical capital to 






′ >  wedge in investment 
returns, despite their unbounded access to credit.  Families in the  2 0 g =  equilibrium face no 
strategic concerns, yet are led by an intergenerational borrowing constraint to invest inefficiently 
in their children’s human capital. 
  It is this group of  2 0 g =  families, where parents are relatively poor, or egoistic, or a child’s 
return to human capital investment falls relatively slowly with additional education, who 
rationally may choose to not meet their expected family contribution, as determined by the 
federal rules determining financial aid for higher education.   
  The next proposition shows financial aid will have different effects on the educational 
attainment of children in the  2 0 g >  and in the  2 0 g = groups.  We distinguish between the 
model’s predictions for the price subsidy and lump sum aid cases, but the qualitative prediction 
is the same:  financial aid will have a larger effect on the educational attainment of students in 
the  2 0 g = group than the  2 0 g >  group. 
Proposition 2:  There are two cases to consider.  First, when aid takes the form of a price 
subsidy, i.e.,  ( , ) (1 )( )









.  When 








.  Financial aid in the form of a price subsidy 
increases equilibrium educational attainment for both  2 0 g >  and  2 0 g =  equilibrium types, but 
the response is larger in the  2 0 g =  equilibrium.  Second, when aid is lump-sum, i.e., 
(, )
pk pk ee e e e τ τ += + + , and when  2 0 g > ,  0
de
dτ




> .  Lump sum financial aid does not influence equilibrium educational attainment in the 
2 0 g >  equilibrium, but it increases equilibrium educational attainment in the  2 0 g =  
                                                                                                                                                             
would be unlikely to be upheld in court if a child failed to follow through on their obligation to repay educational 




  Propositions 1 and 2 formalize our new approach to examining borrowing constraints for 
education.  With data on  2 g  and financial aid for specific parent-child pairs, we can examine the 
correlation between children’s years of schooling and financial aid, conditioning on child 
characteristics, using two separate subsamples.  The first is one in which parents make a post-
schooling transfer ( 2 0 g > ), and the second is one in which they do not ( 2 0 g = ).  Our model 
implies that financial aid will have a greater effect on children’s educational attainment in the 
second ( 2 0 g = ) sample than in the first ( 2 0 g > ) sample.  Indeed, when aid is inframarginal, it 
will have no effect on children’s educational attainment for the  2 0 g >  sample but a positive 
effect on children’s educational attainment in the  2 0 g =  sample. 
  To summarize, the model shows the  2 0 g =  parent will fail to relieve the child’s educational 
borrowing constraint because he or she has no means of extracting the preferred share of the 
return to the efficient educational investment from the child.  The  2 0 g >  parent, however, can 
extract the preferred share of the return by foregone post-schooling transfers, so the parent funds 
the child’s efficient level of human capital investment.  Financial aid, therefore, will have a 
larger effect on the educational attainment of children with  2 0 g =  parents than otherwise 
equivalent children with  2 0 g >  parents.  Moreover, financial aid will increase education for 
children in the latter group in proportion to any price effect created by aid or not at all.  Guided 
by these predictions, we use data from the HRS to examine the extent to which educational 
attainment responds to financial aid among U.S. students who do and do not receive post-
schooling financial support from their families.   
 14
e.  An Economic Environment with Greater Realism 
  A skeptic might argue that that our simple model abstracts away from too many important 
features of reality.  5  Our model is written as if all parents have one child but the theoretical 
predictions are unaffected by siblings.  Recall that the first order condition for human capital 
investment equates the marginal return to investment in human capital with the real interest rate.  
With multiple children, the parents will seek to equate marginal returns for every child.  It 
follows immediately that the parent will not give a cash gift to a child (the marginal return of a 
cash gift is the real interest rate) until the parent has exhausted all possibilities for investment in 
human capital for every child.
12   
  We address additional concerns in Appendix B where we develop a numerical model that 
incorporates three additional features relevant to our problem.  First, in our simple model the two 
parts of the equilibrium are defined by  2 g , second period cash transfers.  If income is uncertain, 
post-college transfers will be affected by income shocks that parents and children receive after 
the child is out of college, so our sample-splitting strategy will not be sharp.  Hence, in the 
Appendix B model we allow for shocks to earnings.  Second, credit card promotions on college 
campuses are commonplace, so we allow the child to borrow at a higher rate than the parent, 
rather than not borrow at all.  Third, many children work while in college.  Consequently, in 
Appendix B we incorporate a standard production function where time and expenditures are 
                                                 
12 The key intuition of the theoretical results also carries over in a world where parents’ preferences may differ from 
the child’s.  Suppose, for example, parents value education for its own sake. To fix ideas, let us assume that parents 
have a utility function of the form  
() 2 12 1 2 (,,, ) () () () () ,
pp p p pk k Ucchg u c u c v h w g βα =+ + +  where  ()
k vh  denotes the utility that parents enjoy from 
their child’s college education and  () wg  proxies for warm glow that parents get from intergenerational transfers.  
The formulation captures the idea that parents value the child’s college education for its own sake.  With these 
preferences and under the assumption that  (0) w′  is finite, the main proposition in the paper goes through.  The 
intuition behind this is straightforward – if the marginal utility from leaving gifts is low enough and finite, some 
parents will not want to give gifts until they have exhausted all options for investing in human capital.  Pollak (1988) 
discusses related considerations.  
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complementary in producing human capital.  This allows us to model a child’s decision to work 
while in college.
13  The model does not have an analytic solution, so we solve it using numerical 
methods.    
  For a broad range of utility and human capital production function parameters, we confirm 
the simple model’s central intuition:  families who do not pass on post-college gifts to their 
children are more likely to under-invest in their children’s education.  Children of parents who 
make post-college gifts are likely to have received transfers that allow them to reach their 
efficient level of education.  Parents who have the option to make an education transfer and 
choose not to are foregoing a high rate of return investment opportunity.  Since parents are at a 
point in their lifecycle where they do not face borrowing constraints, the decision to under-invest 
cannot be rationalized if parents have sufficient resources to make cash gifts later on.  For 
reasonable parameters of the income process, the intuition from the simple model holds 
probabilistically, but the sample split based on  2 g  is no longer sharp. 
  In the Appendix B model, children of parents who do not make education transfers can 
borrow, work while in college, or even postpone college.  Still, their optimal schooling is less 
than the efficient level.  The reason is that each of these “make do” options are costly.  This is 
obviously true for borrowing at an interest rate that exceeds the financial market rate of return.  
Working while in college helps relieve borrowing constraints, but takes time away from human 
capital acquisition as well as leisure.
14 In short, we find that a constrained child who receives no 
help from his or her parents will, at the margin, consume less, work a little more while in college, 
                                                 
13 Work while in college is the mechanism children use to relieve borrowing constraints in Keane and Wolpin 
(2001), for example.  They differ from our approach by assuming all children face the same tuition.  In contrast, we 
assume that there are colleges of varying costs and consequently low income families with high ability children will 
choose to attend less expensive colleges and go to school for fewer years (since time and expenditures are 
complements), if they are borrowing constrained. 
14 Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003) provide evidence on costs of working while in college.  
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and choose to go to a lower cost college for fewer years than would an otherwise identical child 
with more generous parents.  Thus, the additional model features we examine mitigate the 
importance of borrowing constraints, but they do not eliminate their importance.     
II.  The effects of financial aid on education  
 
  The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) has good information on parent-child pairs and 
post-college transfers.  It is a national panel study with an initial sample (in 1992) of 12,652 
persons and 7,607 households.  It oversamples blacks, Hispanics, and residents of Florida.  The 
baseline 1992 study consisted of in-home, face-to-face interviews with the 1931-1941 birth 
cohort and their spouses, if married.  Follow-up interviews were given by telephone in 1994, 
1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004.  Other cohorts, born before 1923 (Asset and Health Dynamics 
of the Oldest Old), between 1923 and 1930 (Children of the Depression), and between 1942 and 
1947 (War Babies), were added to the main HRS cohort in 1998.
15  We use data from all these 
cohorts as long as needed information is available. 
  We also make more limited use of data from the NLSY-97, a national panel survey of 8,984 
youths who were born between 1980 and 1984, first fielded in 1997.
16  We discuss these data as 
they are used in our analyses.   
a. Measuring post-college cash transfers 
 
  In waves 3 through 7 of the HRS respondents are asked the following question about cash 
transfers exceeding $500 in the last 24 months.
17  The specific wording in 2000 (Wave 5) reads:   
                                                 
15A 1948 to 1953 cohort (Early Baby Boomers) was added in 2004, but because we do not have information on this 
group in earlier waves, we do not include them in our study. 
16 The earlier NLSY-79 is not ideal for our work because the latest measure of  2 g  in that survey was elicited when 
children were 21 to 28 years old.  The ideal measure for identifying parents with active post-schooling financial 
linkages gathers information over a long post-college period.  Moreover, the age distribution of the sampling frame 
is such that there are too few siblings to estimate models with family fixed effects.  The value of conditioning on 
time-invariant family-specific factors is discussed below. 
17 Wave 1 asks about transfers exceeding $500 in the last 12 months and wave 2 asks about transfers exceeding $100 
in the last 12 months.  
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“Including help with education but not shared housing or shared food (or any deed to a 
house), in the last 2 years did [the Respondent or Spouse] give financial help totaling $500 
or more to any of their children or grandchildren?” 
   
Those answering “yes” were then asked how much.  We aggregate transfers reported by parents 
over the period 1998-2004 (Waves 4 through 7) for our first measure of post-college cash 
transfers,  2 g .
18  There are three reasons for using this measure.  First, starting in 1998 (wave 4) 
the HRS is a representative sample of all households born before 1948, so it is natural to start 
with this wave.  Second, even if we were willing to ignore data from the new cohorts added to 
the HRS in 1998, it is not clear how to aggregate over the first three waves due to differences in 
the way the transfers question was worded in each wave.  Third, problems with missing 
responses increase with the number of waves we use.   
  We would prefer, however, to use a measure of significant post-college transfers over a 
longer time period in our empirical work.  While no long-term retrospective question on major 
cash transfers to children is available in any of the HRS core surveys, Wave 2 of the HRS, 
fielded in 1994, does include a topical module on parent-child transfers.  The Wave 2 survey (in 
Module 7) asked 827 HRS respondents in 427 households: 
“Other than contributions toward education expenses, have you ever given substantial gifts 
to your grown children?” 
   
  Those who answer “yes” are asked the total amount of these gifts.  This is arguably the 
exact question we require to distinguish families with relatively wealthy or altruistic parents who 
have active post-schooling financial linkages from those with relatively poor or egoistic parents 
who likely have no post-schooling financial linkages.  The drawback to this question is that it 
                                                 
18 Recall that the purpose of 
2 g  is to separate the sample into intergenerationally constrained and unconstrained 
parent-child pairs.  The fact that the primary transfer question includes grandchildren is not ideal, given that the 
model we write down considers only two generations.  But we think parents making cash gifts to grandchildren are 
likely to have relieved educational borrowing constraints for their children, so we do not view the inclusion of 
grandchildren in the transfers question to be an important limitation of the study.   
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was asked only of a small subsample.  Thus we report estimates using both the shorter window 
of cash transfers observed for the full HRS sample and this longer transfer window observed 
only for Wave 2, Module 7 respondents.  Responses to this question are available for 334 of the 
9,471 families for whom we have complete demographic and education information on multiple 
siblings aged 24 and older.  These families include 1,262 children.
19 
b. A proxy for financial aid
20   
 
  Financial support for college in the U.S., besides the resources that come from parents, 
relatives, and the student, comes in three primary forms:  federally supported grants, federally 
supported loans, and state and institutional aid.
21  Grants and loans for students pursuing post-
secondary, graduate, and professional education were initiated by the U.S. Higher Education Act 
of 1965.  The Higher Education Act was reauthorized every 4 years between 1968 and 1980, and 
every 6 years thereafter.  
  It would be difficult to trace and aggregate all of the historical details of U.S. financial aid 
policy over the relevant period for our sample children, and impossible to uncover parental asset 
and income information relevant to financial aid formulas at the potential date of college entry 
                                                 
19 Appendix Table 1 gives more detail on the construction of the full HRS sample and the module sample that we 
use for our analyses. 
20 We are extremely grateful to Lance Lochner, and to Dan Madzelan of the Department of Education, for sharing 
detailed correspondence and files on historical US financial aid rules. Additional information is drawn from Baum 
(1987).  Other helpful discussions of federal financial aid policy can be found in NCES (2004), Kane (1998, 2006), 
Kim (1999), Monks (2004), and Wu (2006). 
21 We do not know the specific college the student attended or the state the student lived in when they attended 
college or the state the parent lives in at the time of sampling.  Consequently, we do not account for 
institutional/state aid.  The aggregate amount of this aid, however, is dwarfed by the aid distributed by the federal 
formulas, which are the focus of our discussion.  Moreover, the types of institutions that have significant amounts of 
merit-based aid (generally Ivy League schools and some additional private institutions with large endowments) 
educate a small proportion of the students that attend college in the U.S.  So the omission of private, merit-based 
financial aid is likely to be minor.  States’ support for higher education comes largely through allocations to their 
state university system.  They provide relatively little financial aid to students.  According to Baum (1987) and the 
College Entrance Examination Board (1986), state and institutional aid constituted 18, 17 and 23 percent of financial 
aid to students in 1975, 1980 and 1985, respectively.  Some of this state and institutional aid was allocated based on 
the rules we describe.  Almost all of the remaining aid came from the federal programs we describe.  
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for each sample child.
22  One consistent feature of the aid formulas, however, allows us to infer a 
major component of within-family aid variation from family structure alone.  Each major need 
calculation formula used to allocate financial aid from the leading federal grant and loan 
programs over the relevant period includes an EFC that decreases sharply as the number of 
college-going children in the family increases. 
  The Basic Educational Opportunity Grant, a successor (along with the Supplemental 
Educational Opportunity Grant) of 1965’s Educational Opportunity Grant, was established in 
1972.
23  In determining a student applicant’s eligibility, the formula for the Basic Educational 
Opportunity Grant calculated the student’s family’s “Adjusted Available Income” (AAI).  The 
Family Contribution (or EFC) required by the formula was then a proportion of the AAI, and the 
proportion depended on the number of children the family would have in college in the coming 
academic year.  As an example taken from the application forms for the 1979-80 academic year, 
a family with one child in college was expected to contribute 100 percent of its AAI toward 
college costs, a family with two children in college was expected to contribute 140 percent of its 
AAI in total (70 percent per child), and a family with four children in college was expected to 
contribute only 160 percent of its AAI in total (40 percent per child).  Over the entire sample 
period, the expected contribution declined steeply and nonlinearly in the number of children in 
college for all types of need-based federal education grants. 
  Similar rules apply to loans, though of course, institutional details differ.  The Guaranteed 
Student Loan (GSL) program was established by the 1965 Higher Education Act as the major 
                                                 
22 Twenty-three percent of children in the underlying dataset attended college in the 1960s or earlier, 37 percent 
attended in the 1970s, 34 percent attended in the 1980s, and 6 percent attended in the 1990s.   
23 It was renamed the Pell Grant in 1980, but retained the basic structure of the Basic Educational Opportunity 
Grant.  
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federal student loan program.
24  While rules determining loan eligibility and amounts have varied 
over the years, all treated student siblings the same way.
25  For a given student applicant, a 
family AAI was calculated based on the student’s family’s income and assets.  The EFC was 
then determined as the AAI divided by the number of children from that family attending college 
in the relevant academic year.  This is also a feature of some forms of campus-based aid.   
  To summarize, the objective of federal aid, in cooperation with most U.S. colleges, is to 
provide grants and loans that cover the cost of attendance after the individual student’s expected 
family contribution is removed, where the cost of attending college for a given student includes 
tuition and fees, room and board, books and travel expenses.  Given the rules determining grant 
and loan awards, there may be large swings in individual siblings’ costs of college as family 
members age through the education process, which can result in substantial differences in the 
costs of educating siblings within the same family.
26 
  We use the variation in college financial aid due to children’s birth spacing to proxy for 
unobserved aid levels.
27  The median year in which children in our HRS sample reach the age of 
18 is 1977, with most being college age in the 1970s, 80s, and early 90s.  The landmark 1965 
reforms in higher education finance occurred after the vast majority of children in our sample 
were born, so decisions about birth spacing were very unlikely to be affected by financial aid 
considerations. 
                                                 
24 The program was renamed the Stafford loan program in 1987. 
25 Broadly speaking, there have been three sets of rules governing the allocation of guaranteed student loans.  From 
1965 to 1974, loans were allocated based on third-party need analysis formulas “approved” by the Department of 
Education. In 1974, these third-party formulas were formalized as the Uniform Methodology. In 1986 the Uniform 
Methodology was replaced by the (similar) Congressional Methodology, which was controlled by the Department of 
Education.  Finally, along with many other reforms, the 1992 HEA merged the need formulas determining grant and 
loan eligibility into the Federal Need Analysis Methodology.  
26 For example, for many years of the sample, EFC=AAI/N, where N is the number of children in the family 
attending college. 
27 Our use of child birth spacing is similar to the approaches taken by Kim (1999) and Monks (2004) to estimate the 
savings effects of the asset tax implicit in the federal financial aid formula.  
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  A natural question to ask is whether sibling overlap is significantly, positively correlated 
with financial aid.  We cannot examine the relationship between sibling overlap and financial aid 
using the HRS because it does not include information on financial aid.  But we can examine the 
relationship using the NLSY-97.  To do this we regress the financial aid a student received in his 
or her first term of college on a set of covariates, including parental income, parental income 
squared, net worth, net worth squared, AFQT, AFQT squared, a constant, and a measure of 
sibling overlap.  We measure a point-in-time sibling overlap variable as the number of siblings 
who are college age (ages 18 through 21) at the time financial aid is being measured for the child 
in question.
28  The sibling overlap variable does not require the sibling to be in college at the 
time, since this information is not available in the HRS, the data used for our primary analysis.
29  
The coefficient of the overlap variable given in Appendix Table 2 is $367 and it is significant at 
the 5 percent level.
30  This result, along with evidence from Liu and van der Klaauw (2007), adds 
to our confidence that the financial aid proxy used in the HRS analyses does, in fact, capture 
financial aid differences within and across families. 
  Given that parental resources affect financial aid, families might want to declare their 
children’s financial independence.  The standards for independence, however, are strict.  In order 
to declare independence a student must (i) reach age 24 by January of the academic year, or (ii) 
enroll in a graduate program, or (iii) be married, or (iv) have a dependent child or other 
dependents, or (v) be an orphan or ward of the court, or (vi) be a veteran of the U.S. Armed 
                                                 
28 We used the household and non-household rosters to construct information on respondents’ siblings (so that we 
could get siblings living both in and out of the respondent’s home).  Siblings are defined to be biological, half, step, 
adoptive, or foster siblings.  Our measure of financial aid includes the dollar amount of any grants, scholarships, 
loans, work study, or other kinds of government/institutional aid a respondent received during his/her first term of 
post-secondary schooling.   
29 Another reason the overlap proxy relies on potential and not actual overlap in college attendance is because 
realized overlap or a siblings’ realized college attendance while the child is 18-21 would be mechanically related to 
our outcome variable of interest, educational attainment. 
30 The mean financial aid for all NLSY-97 college students is slightly under $3,000.  
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Forces (IFAP 2006).  Thus a child under age 24, whose parents decide not to make the expected 
family contribution, will need to cut back their schooling, work while in college, stretch out the 
time they are in college, or find some other way to adapt.  As discussed earlier, all these 
adaptations lower the net returns to schooling so, as argued in Appendix B, the implications of 
the model still hold. 
c. Estimation samples and covariates 
  Our sample selection criteria include the requirement that we observe parents’ household 
income and net worth and complete information on the education, date of birth, and relationship 
to the family of each child reported by the HRS respondent.  We also require that children 
included in the estimation have at least one sibling (this drops 1,502 one-child households).  
Finally, we include only children aged 24 or older (in 2000) in our estimation sample.  The 
intention of this restriction is to allow the sample children time to complete their schooling, and 
to consider only cash transfers that take place following completion of the children’s schooling.
31  
This leaves us with a sample of 34,593 children from 9,471 HRS families. 
  Our empirical models include child variables that allow us to condition on factors that may 
influence the schooling attained by a young adult student, particularly relative to his or her 
siblings.  These include the child’s age in 2000, the child’s gender, indicators for whether the 
child is an oldest or youngest child, and a cumulative measure of sibling-years of overlap for a 
college-age child.  Specifically, the child’s sibling-years of overlap is the sum of the number of 
siblings the child had between the ages of 18 and 21 while he or she was 18, plus the number of 
siblings aged 18-21 while he or she was 19, and so on, until the child is age 21.
32   
                                                 
31 The qualitative results are similar if we require sample children to be aged 30 or older in 2000. 
32 Triplets, for example, each have eight sibling-years of overlap in college ages.  A child with two siblings who are 
three and six years younger, respectively, has one sibling-year of overlap in college ages.  The middle child in this 
family has two years of overlap, and the youngest child has one.  
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  Table 1 gives descriptive information for these variables for both the full HRS analysis 
sample and for the Wave 2, Module 7 respondents.  Forty-nine percent of core sample children 
have parents who made positive cash transfers to them or to a sibling between 1998 and 2004, 
and 37 percent of the children of module respondents have parents who ever made substantial 
non-educational transfers to their adult children.
33  These variables allow us to split samples 
based on post-schooling transfers as suggested by the analytic model.  Roughly half of each 
sample is female. The median child age in 2000 is 41 for both samples.  Birth order indicators 
tell us that 29 (26) percent of core (module) sample children are oldest siblings, 26 (24) percent 
youngest, and 45 (50) percent are middle siblings.  We exclude any variables that were likely 
determined after the completion of the child’s schooling, such as marital status or earnings in 
2000.  
  The dependent variable in our primary empirical specification is the child’s education.  Core 
sample children have attained a mean of 13.8 and a median of 13.0 years of schooling (it is 13.3 
and 12.0 in the module sample).  The large sample and broad range of ages give us a standard 
deviation of 6.88 years of schooling, despite the top-coding of schooling years to 17 for graduate 
and professional education.
34  The primary independent variable of interest is years of overlap 
with siblings.  Its mean and median are 2.34 and 2.00 in the core sample and 2.63 and 2.00 in the 
module sample.  There is substantial variation in sibling-years of overlap in both samples, with a 
standard deviation for this variable of roughly 2.1 years in each. 
                                                 
33 Readers might expect that the fraction of the sample ever giving cash gifts would exceed the fraction of the 
sample giving cash gifts between 1998 and 2004.  Three factors make the 49 and 37 percent responses not 
comparable.  First, the Wave 2, Module 7 question refers to “substantial” gifts while the other question asks 
specifically about gifts exceeding $500.  Second, the Wave 2, Module 7 question is asked of a much narrower cohort 
of households.  Third, the core sample question includes gifts to grandchildren exceeding $500. 
34 The youngest children in the sample are 24. The oldest 1.8 percent of children have reached retirement age.  
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III. The empirical model, results, and robustness 
 
  Many factors likely influence the difference in schooling between two arbitrarily chosen, 
unrelated students.  Among other issues, parents may differ in their attitudes toward education 
and the investments they make in their children.  Heritable components of academic aptitude that 
the students received from their parents might also differ.  We would have a difficult time 
controlling adequately for these between-family differences using the HRS data.  We therefore 
examine the implications of Proposition 2 by making within-family comparisons, examining the 
educational attainment of closely-spaced siblings (who are expected to get more financial aid) 
relative to the educational attainment of siblings spaced further apart (who are expected to get 
less financial aid).  Moreover, we expect the effects of financial aid to be larger for children who 
come from families who go not make post-college transfers  2 (0 ) g =  than for those that do 
2 (0 ) . g >   
  Our empirical model is:   
 , is i is is is eX o ω βγ ε =+ + +  (5) 
 
where families are indexed by i = 1,…,N and siblings in family i by  1,..., i sS = .
35  In this 
expression  is e  represents the education of sibling s in family i,  is X  is a vector of exogenous 
characteristics of sibling s in family i, and  is o  represents the number of years of overlap in 
college ages that sibling s in family i shares with his or her siblings.  The family fixed effect  i ω  
represents the unobservable contribution to educational attainment shared by the children of 
family i, and accounts for the effect of family wealth and other characteristics that do not vary 
within the family.  Because siblings in two-child families will have identical overlap, γ  is 
                                                 
35 The number of siblings varies from 2 to 11 across families, creating an unbalanced panel.    
 25
identified directly by families with 3 or more children.  Most parent-child pairs remain in the 
sample for our empirical work.  More than 57 percent of families in the HRS have 3 or more 
children, about 80 percent of the parent-child pairs in our sample come from families with 3 or 
more children.  Two-child families, of course, help identify coefficients on other covariates in 
the empirical models and since the sibling overlap estimate is determined jointly with all of these 
other coefficients, two-child families contribute indirectly to the identification of the sibling 
overlap estimate.   
  The main coefficient of interest is γ , the effect of the overlap variable (which proxies for 
financial aid) on children’s total schooling.  Table 2 reports estimates for the gift and no-gift 
subsamples using the full HRS sample and the special question asked of Wave 2, Module 7 
respondents.  We find a coefficient on overlap of 0.105 in the no-gift, full HRS sample, which is 
significantly different from zero at the one percent level.
36  The corresponding coefficient in the 
gift, full HRS sample is 0.034.  The estimate is not significantly different from zero at standard 
confidence levels.  A similar pattern emerges in the results using the Wave 2, Module 7 sample.  
The coefficient on overlap in the no-gift sample is 0.094 and differs significantly from zero at the 
one percent level.  The coefficient on overlap in the gift sample is -0.050 and is insignificant.
37 
  The overlap estimate of 0.105 implies that a twin with no other siblings in a family that does 
not make post-college transfers will complete, on average, 0.42 years more schooling than an 
otherwise equivalent only child, all else equal.  The estimate applies to the specific child in the 
parent-child pair.  To help assess the economic importance of these estimates, consider the 
                                                 
36 To the extent there is error in our sample-splitting strategy, as would occur, for example, in the numerical model 
in Appendix B, the size of the estimates and power of the tests will be reduced and hence bias us away from finding 
significant results.  Guo (2007) provides a straightforward proof. 
37 In simultaneous estimation of all group-specific coefficients for the gift and no gift samples, F-tests reject the null 
hypotheses that the gift and no gift overlap coefficients are the same for the full and module samples at the ten and 
six percent levels, respectively.  
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following calculation.  Assume that the child has two parents, one of whom worked and earned 
the 1983 median U.S. household income of $20,885.
38  We assume that students first get 
whatever Pell grants they are entitled to, based on rules from the Pell Grant Index that applied to 
the 1984-85 academic year.  Remaining unmet need is then met through Guaranteed Student 
Loans and campus-based aid, which is allocated based on applicable rules.  We assume the 
student attends an average-cost 4 year, public, in-state institution.  Total annual tuition, fees, 
room and board, based on figures from the National Center for Education Statistics, was $3,682 
in 1984 dollars.  Over four years of college, the difference in total financial aid offered to two 
otherwise identical students, one with a twin attending college and the other with no siblings 
attending college, was $1,728 in 1984 dollars, which is $3,568 in 2009 dollars.  Thus, we infer 
on average that $3,568 (in 2009 dollars) of additional financial aid would result in 0.4 additional 
years of educational attainment for a student whose family does not make post-college 
transfers.
39  Of course, not all students appear to be intergenerationally constrained.  Further, it 
would be very difficult to offer aid exclusively to intergenerationally constrained but not to 
intergenerationally unconstrained students.  About half the sample is in the “no gift” group.  
Hence, we infer that the overall effect of an increase in available financial aid of approximately 
$3,600 to all students would led to an average increase of 0.2 years of final educational 
attainment.   
  We can assess the plausibility of this estimate making use of a simple calculation of the rate 
of return to additional financial aid.  As inputs we need estimates of the lifetime earnings of the 
                                                 
38 The detailed financial need formulas (and the tax calculations they necessitate) require several other assumptions 
regarding family characteristics. We assume that the child has assets that do not exceed asset exemption thresholds, 
is dependent on their parents and receives no Social Security or Veteran’s education benefits. We assume that 
parents have assets that do not exceed the exemption thresholds, pay average state taxes given their income level, 
make no IRA/Keogh contributions, and have no other untaxed income, excessive medical expenses or primary or 
secondary tuition expenses.  
39 This figure is very similar to that implied by the estimates in Appendix Table 2.  The estimate of $367.19 
multiplied by 8 semesters is $2,939 in 2000 dollars, which is $3,662 in 2009 dollars.  
 27
HRS cohort’s children, the return to schooling, and the costs (including opportunity costs) of 
education.  We find the return to this investment is around 17 percent.
40  Given the deadweight 
loss of taxation and the uncertainty associated with the investment (returns, for example, surely 
vary by type of major), the rate of return calculation supports the plausibility of the estimates. 
  Proposition 2 suggested that aid could have a positive effect on educational attainment even 
in the sample of parent-child pairs where parents made post-college gifts.  A key question is 
whether the last dollar the family invests comes from the family or comes from financial aid.  If 
it comes from the family, aid is a lump sum transfer and we would expect no effect of overlap in 
the  2 0 g >  sample.  If it does not come solely from the family, aid would be expected to increase 
educational attainment, but by not as much as in the  2 0 g =  sample.  We do not know the 
relative prevalence of the two forms of aid in the data, but the fact that we get little or no 
estimated aid effect for the unconstrained families suggests that the inframarginal aid case better 
characterizes the data for the  2 0 g >  sample.
41   
                                                 
40 Financial aid for a twin (relative to a child with siblings spaced 5 or more years apart) is $1,700 in 1984 dollars. 
 This subsidy leads children from constrained families to acquire 0.4 more years of schooling.  Assume a real 
interest rate of 5 percent and a rate of return to education of 8 percent.  The annual tuition and required fees was 
$2,567 (excluding room and board) in 1984-85 (National Center for Education Statistics 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d08/tables/dt08_331.asp).  In the presence of a subsidy of $1,700, the student 
chooses to go to school for an extra 0.4 years.  Consequently, the student will pay additional tuition and also bears 
the opportunity cost of going to school for an additional 0.4 years.  Using cross sectional annual earnings 
information from the Current Population Survey, we construct a 40-year age-earnings profile for a hypothetical 
average child.  The implied return to investing in the constrained child is 33 percent. The government, of course, 
cannot distinguish constrained from unconstrained children, so the return to the generic, average financial aid dollar 
would be roughly half the return to the constrained child. Even this likely is an overestimate since college education 
is heavily subsidized and the student does not pay the true marginal cost associated with an additional year of 
schooling. 
41 The financial aid proxy in the full sample results is almost always positive, though imprecisely estimated in the 
2 0 g >  (unconstrained) subsample. 
      As a further check on our arguments, we estimated the model of Table 2 with two additional subsamples, those 
where  2 0 and  0
p ge == and those where  2 0 and  0
p ge >= .  We expect the overlap coefficient to be larger and 
even more significant in the first subsample than in the Table 2 (no gift) sample, despite the smaller sample size 
(since we eliminate families that might undo financial aid given to closely spaced siblings).  We continue to expect 
no (or undetectable price) effects for the second subsample.  Strikingly, this is precisely what we find.  The overlap 
coefficient for the first subsample is 0.146, with a t-statistic of 4.11.  The overlap coefficient for the second 
subsample is -0.037 with a t-statistic of 0.78.    
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  Other coefficients in Table 2 reflect the correlations between children’s demographic 
characteristics at the time of schooling decisions and their educational attainment.  Brothers get 
less schooling than their sisters on average, and this effect is significant at the five percent level 
in two of the samples.  The implied difference in schooling between brothers and sisters on 
average is a third of a year or less.  Controlling for birth order, older siblings get significantly 
less schooling than younger ones in both no-gift samples; one year more of age is associated with 
5 hundredths of a year of school in the two samples.  Oldest children receive more education 
than their middle-child siblings on average, though the estimated coefficient on the oldest child 
indicator is significantly different from zero for only one of the four samples.  There is no clear 
pattern in the level of schooling of youngest children relative to those of middle children. 
  A question may arise about why we focus on financial aid instead of, for example, more 
general resources that improve the income of the parent.  In particular, whenever  0
p e >  at the 
initial  , τ  the parent has chosen a level of educational investment that exceeds the amount of 
financial aid.  If aid came in the form of a financial transfer to the parent rather than through  , τ  
the parent would choose the same net educational investment.  The interesting case for our paper, 
therefore, occurs when  0
p e =  at the initial  , τ   since in this case the allocation between τ  and 
p x  will affect equilibrium education.  This is an empirically important case.  When  2 0 g =  and 
we can see 
p e  (that is, the child attended some college),  0
p e =  54 percent of the time for at least 
one child in the family.   
  Given that parents do not face borrowing constraints in the model, it might also seem 
curious that we focus on the overlap of the child in the specific parent-child pair, rather than the 
general overlap of all siblings.  When  2 0 and  0
p ge = = , however, the parent and child are 
                                                                                                                                                             
      Any result not shown in the paper is available from the authors on request.  
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intergenerationally constrained – indeed, if anything, the parent would like to borrow against the 
child’s resources but cannot do so due to their inability to write a binding contract with their 
child.  As noted above, for the no-gift  2 (0 ) g =  sample, among those families where at least one 
child got some college or more, 54 percent of families have at least one child with some college 
or more and  0
p e = .  For these families, a closely spaced sibling in college does not generate 
resources that can be used by a sibling 5 years younger, since the parent cannot crowd out 
financial aid with a further reduction in private parental transfers.  Consequently, the constrained 
parent is unable to move around resources from twins, for example, to assist a younger child.   
  Before describing our robustness checks, we briefly mention two less far-reaching 
specification and sampling alternatives.  First, we recognize the coefficient estimates on gender, 
age, and youngest and oldest child indicators vary across samples in magnitude and significance.  
Specifications where we exclude all within-family covariates except the family effect and the 
overlap measure also yield a positive and highly significant overlap coefficient for the no gift 
group and a small, insignificant overlap coefficient for the gift group.  So the key result in Table 
2 is not sensitive to the inclusion of covariates.  It also does not depend on whether or not step-
children are included in the sample.  Several authors have noted that parent-child behavior and 
outcomes can differ for stepchildren relative to biological children of either parent.
42  We 
repeated the central estimation shown in Table 2 using only never married parents and parents 
who were still married to their first spouses in 2000 in an effort to drop step families.  The results 
for the parameters of interest were very similar. 
b. Estimation issues and sensitivity analyses with the HRS sample 
  In the remainder of this section we describe six sampling or robustness checks that increase 
                                                 
42 See, for example, Light and McGarry (2004), Brown (2006), and Pezzin, Pollak, and Schone (2006).  
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our confidence that we are interpreting the empirical results sensibly.  While we elaborate on 
each in greater detail below, we can roughly break the discussion into a) who is being affected – 
here we make sure the affected groups are, in fact, children who could plausibly be affected by 
financial aid; and b) is it something else – here we try to rule out spurious explanations for the 
results.   
1.  Who is being affected?  The distributional effects of financial aid policy  
  There are nonlinearities in the financial aid system that we do not account for in the 
equation (5) empirical model.  In particular, the children of very wealthy parents should expect 
no federal financial aid whether or not they have siblings in college (also see Monks, 2004).   
Similarly, federal aid formulas provide approximately full support to the children of very poor 
parents, and therefore educational achievement should be unrelated to sibling overlap.  Thus, 
even in the no-gift subsample, we might expect years of schooling to be unresponsive to sibling 
overlap for children in low-income families, because they receive full financial aid, and for 
children in high wealth families, because there will be no differences in schooling costs across 
children (within a family) due to financial aid considerations.
43 
                                                 
43  Before the Middle Income Student Assistance Act in 1978, students with family incomes above $15,000 were 
ineligible for Basic Educational Opportunity Grant (Pell grant) funding.  Median U.S. family income in 1978 was 
$15,064, so students with family income above the median had limited access to federal grant-based aid.  The 
Middle Income Student Assistant Act expanded Basic Educational Opportunity Grant (Pell grant) aid beyond the 
$15,000 cap.  However, in the 1979-80 academic year, roughly 80 percent of Basic Educational Opportunity Grant 
(Pell grant) dollars went to students with family incomes below the median. The Pell program favored lower income 
students even more in subsequent years, with roughly 95 percent of academic year 1983-4 Pell grant dollars going to 
students with family incomes below the median.  Given that 33 percent of U.S. college students received Pell grant 
aid in 1980, and that 38 percent of the High School and Beyond (a nationally representative education dataset) 
seniors in 1980 who attended college came from the lower half of the family “socioeconomic status” distribution (17 
percent from the first quartile), it seems reasonable to characterize access to federal grant aid for low income 
students as extensive in the late 1970s and early 1980s (these figures come from Baum, 1987, the Statistical Abstract 
of the United States 1985, and information from the College Entrance Board) .  
     Other forms of student aid were available, to some degree, to students with family incomes above the median.  
Prior to the Middle Income Student Assistance Act, the cap on family income of $25,000 for Guaranteed Student 
Loan aid was located at roughly the 80
th percentile of the U.S. income distribution.  The cap was relaxed following 
the Middle Income Student Assistance Act, leading to a more than tripling of Guaranteed Student Loan aid.   
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  To address the concern about non-linearities, we repeat the initial estimation, but this time 
estimate separate overlap coefficients for each parental net worth tercile.  Estimates are given in 
Table 3 using the full HRS sample and a sample based on the special question asked of Wave 2, 
Module 7 respondents.  The estimated overlap coefficients are small and not significantly 
different from zero for each of the net worth terciles of both gift samples.  In the no gift samples, 
we find small, insignificant overlap coefficients for the poorest and wealthiest terciles.  However, 
the significant (at conventional level) point estimates on sibling overlap are 0.189 for the middle 
tercile of the full HRS sample and 0.197 for the much smaller special module sample.  F-tests 
reject the null hypotheses that the middle tercile coefficient is equal to the high and low tercile 
coefficients at the five and ten percent levels, respectively in the full sample (but only rejects the 
equality of the middle and high coefficients in the smaller module sample).  
  Parental net worth, observed when children are, at the median, 40 years old, is clearly an 
imperfect measure of parental income and net worth while the child was in school.  Some 
children whose parents’ net worth is in the bottom tercile presumably did not receive aid, while  
some children whose parents’ net worth is in the top tercile perhaps did.  We nevertheless 
believe this specification is useful in helping us understand whether the Table 2 sibling overlap 
results are driven by something other than financial aid.  Given the extensive aid available to low 
income students when the bulk of our sample was college age, and the manner in which aid 
availability phased out for higher incomes, we would be suspicious of estimated sibling overlap 
effects on educational attainment that were as strong for students from bottom-tercile or top-
tercile families as they were for students from more representative families.  But this is not what 
we find.  The evidence that the effect of sibling overlap on educational attainment is strongest for 
                                                                                                                                                             
Roughly 41 percent and 37 percent of campus-based work study aid dollars went to students with family incomes 
above the median in the 1979-80 and 1982-3 academic years, respectively.    
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middle wealth families in two samples is encouraging, given the structure of financial aid policy. 
2.  Who is being affected?  Historical changes in financial aid policy 
  Financial aid to middle and higher income families increased substantially in 1978 as a 
result of the Middle Income Student Assistance Act (MISAA).  Before the MISAA, the Pell 
Grant and Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) family income caps were $15,000 and $25,000, 
respectively.  The U.S. median household income in 1978 was $15,064.  The MISAA extended 
both types of aid to children of families with higher incomes, and was followed by a tripling in 
the number of GSL program loans over 3 academic years.
44 
  With more aid available for middle-income children as a consequence of the MISAA, we 
expect the main beneficial effects on attendance to occur for those children who now have 
greater access to aid, but whose parents, for one reason or another, were not fully committed to 
paying for college.  In the context of the Table 3 empirical specification, we expect the 
interaction of overlap and the middle wealth tercile to be larger (while still positive and 
significant) following the MISAA than before enactment of the MISAA.  We further expect the 
MISAA to have smaller or no beneficial effects on attendance for the  2 0 g >  subsample (though 
parents presumably benefit from inframarginal subsidies).    
  We split the sample into a pre-reform subsample that includes only students who reached 
age 18 in 1978 or before, prior to the bill passage and expansion in aid.  The post-reform 
subsample includes only students who reached age 18 in 1979 or later, after the aid expansion.  
Estimates for the Table 3 empirical model, pre- and post-reform, are given in Table 4.   
  As expected, the coefficient for the overlap by middle wealth tercile interaction is precisely 
estimated and larger – nearly twice the size – in the post-reform subsample as in the pre-reform 
                                                 
44 Further detail on the short-run effects of this and other aid reforms can be found in Baum (1986).  
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subsample.  Hence the expansion of aid to families above the median income following the 
MISAA is accompanied by a shift in the estimated association between the aid proxy and 
attainment of children in middle wealth families.
45 
  As in the previous specification, the overlap by high-wealth interaction is insignificant in 
both groups both pre- and post-reform.  In addition, five of six coefficients in the  2 0 g >  
subsample are insignificant, as expected.  We find two unexpected results in Table 4, both 
occurring for the pre-reform sample for the overlap-by-lowest-wealth-tercile coefficients.  The 
positive, significant coefficient for the low-wealth, no-gift pre-reform subsample might suggest 
that aid was scarce even for low-wealth (and income) children, so having a closely spaced sibling 
enhanced the ability to finance college relative to observationally similar children without a 
closely spaced sibling.  A potential explanation for the negative significant coefficient for closely 
spaced siblings in families who made post-college gifts arises from the fact that the Basic 
Educational Opportunity Grant was limited to half of the cost of college when it was 
implemented in 1972, and no supplemental grant program existed to cover the residual.  Hence 
students whose need profiles qualified them for full Basic Educational Opportunity Grant aid 
without the presence of a sibling might not be aided, and might in fact be hurt, by a sibling 
entering college around the same time and competing for family resources.   
3.  Who is being affected?  The attainment margin should be related to college 
  Many children in our samples were born in the late 1940s and 1950s.  A high school degree 
for this cohort was less common than it is today.  Our preferred interpretation of our results 
would clearly be wrong if the margin through which education increases for closely-spaced 
children in the no-gift sample is that they were more likely to get to 11
th grade rather than 10
th 
                                                 
45 The coefficients also reflect the fact discussed by Kane (2006) and Belley and Lochner (2007) and others that the 
real cost of college has risen sharply while federal financial aid has not kept pace.    
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grade.  Put differently, college financial aid should have its primary influence on college 
enrollment and attainment.   
  When we exclude high school dropouts, we get similar results for the association between 
overlap and educational attainment, with the exception that the positive, significant overlap 
coefficient in the no-gift sample is substantially larger.
46  As in Kling (2001), we find that the 
response to our schooling cost measure is greatest at the college entry margin. 
4:  Is it something else?  Ability and birth spacing 
  We do not have an ability measure in the HRS.  This is one of the reasons why a within-
family (fixed effect) specification is useful, since it accounts for time-invariant, family-specific 
ability differences that might arise from the home environment.  Nevertheless, there are 
obviously ability differences between children within a family.  If closely spaced children have 
significantly different ability than children with greater birth spacing, our HRS-based estimates 
might be biased.  For this bias to explain most or all of the results, it must be the case that the 
ability levels of closely spaced children exceed the ability levels of children spaced apart in 
families where there are no post-schooling transfers (constrained families, or families with 
2 0 g = ), and this ability differential with birth spacing does not occur in unconstrained ( 2 0 g > ) 
families.  If families with closely spaced kids are resource-constrained over their life-cycle, 
either in the time or the money they are able to allocate to closely-spaced siblings, it seems 
unlikely the constrained subset have higher ability children relative to others, at least in an 
economically important magnitude. 
  We can shed a little further light on this potential explanation using data from the NLSY-97:  
in particular, we look at whether sibling overlap is correlated with AFQT.  In Appendix Table 3 
                                                 
46 We used a conditional logit specification to estimate the effect of sibling overlap on high school completion in 
samples and specifications otherwise identical to those in Table 2.  We found no significant association between 
sibling overlap and high school completion for either the gift or the no-gift samples.      
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we show the result of regressing AFQT on sibling overlap and covariates that we expect to be 
correlated with AFQT, including mother’s education, parental income, parental income squared, 
indicator variables for the number of siblings, female, black, Hispanic, broken home, living in an 
urban area, and living in the South.  Sibling overlap is significantly correlated with AFQT, but 
the relationship is negative, and the empirical magnitude is -0.51, while the standard deviation of 
AFQT is 29.2 in the sample.  Hence, we find it implausible that unobserved ability accounts for 
the empirical patterns we document in the HRS data. 
5:  Is it something else?  The role of altruism 
  Underlying family characteristics – parental resources, the shape of the human capital 
production function, and altruism – will determine the region of the parent-child equilibrium.    
One unusual feature of the HRS is that it includes, for a small subsample, self-reported measures 
of parents’ financial generosity toward their children.  Wave 5 of the HRS from 2000 contains an 
Economic Altruism Module where parents were asked 
“Suppose that [your child/one of your children] had only half/three-quarters/one-third as 
much income per person to live on as you do. Would you be willing to give your child 
5% of your own family income per month, to help out until things changed – which 
might be several years?” 
 
Our analytic model shows that post-college giving will be more common among parents with 
higher α  values.  If the responses to the special HRS module question are informative about α , 
we expect financial aid to have a smaller effect on the educational attainment of children with 
high-α parents than those with low-α parents. 
  914 parents (with 3,292 children) responded to this question and have complete information 
on other covariates included in our empirical model.  Only 3 percent of children had parents who 
said they would give at 1/3 but not above.  So we pool the 1/3 respondents with those who 
indicate that they would not give 5 percent of their income under any of the scenarios.    
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  We estimate the empirical model given in (5), modified so that   
3
1
, is i is j j is is
j
eX m o ω βγ ε
=
=+ + + ∑  (6) 
where indicators 1 m = 1 if the parent gives under no circumstances or only when the child’s 
income is 1/3 of hers (12 percent of the sample),  2 m = 1 if the parent gives when the child’s 
income is ½ of hers but not when it is ¾ (26 percent of the sample), and  3 m = 1 if the parent gives 
when the child’s income is ¾ of hers (62 percent of the sample). 
  The estimates are presented in Table 5.  The overlap coefficient is insignificant (with a t-
statistic below one) for the most altruistic families:  those who will give 5 percent of their 
income when their child’s person-adjusted income is ¾ of theirs.  The overlap coefficient is 
large, positive and highly significant for each of the less generous parent categories.  F-tests fail 
to reject the null hypothesis that  12 γ γ =  but strongly reject the null that  123 γ γγ ==.  To the 
extent that high self-reported generosity is predictive of the giving equilibrium, these results also 
align with the model and our previous results in that financial aid is inframarginal for children of 
the most altruistic parents but that it matters for the children of other parents. 
  Bequests are another type of post-schooling transfer.  We observe relatively few actual 
bequests in our data.  But in a similar altruism module fielded in 1994 (Wave 2, Module 7), a 
subset of HRS parents were asked whether they thought “leaving a significant estate for grown 
children” was “very important, somewhat important or not at all important.”  In Table 6 we show 
the results from estimating the Table 5 altruism model, but replacing the previous altruism 
measures with indicators for whether or not parents thought it was very important to leave a 
significant estate.  We find the estimated overlap coefficient among students whose parents did 
not think it very important to leave a significant estate is 0.186 and significant at the 1 percent  
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level.  The overlap coefficient among students whose parents did think leaving a significant 
estate is very important is 0.055 and not significantly different from zero.  We also used the 
bequest measures available to us for living parents in the HRS 2000 core sample.  Parents were 
asked the probability of their leaving a bequest of $100,000 or more.
47  Using the set of HRS 
2000 core families who had complete responses, the overlap coefficient for students whose 
parents expect to leave a bequest of $100,000 or more is 0.047 and is not significantly different 
from zero.  For students whose parents do not expect to leave a bequest of $100,000 or more, the 
overlap coefficient is 0.109 and is significant at the one percent level.  The estimated differences 
in the effect of the financial aid proxy by whether parents appear likely to leave bequests works 
precisely as proposition 2 suggests.   
6.  Additional evidence from the NLSY-97    
  We do not have data on 
p e  in the HRS data.  The NLSY-97, however, does have this 
information, which allows us to examine two additional implications of our analytic framework.  
First, when parents make no contribution to college and their expected family contribution is 
positive, borrowing constraints imply the probability of completing college should decline with 
parental income.  This expected empirical pattern is precisely the opposite of the positive 
college-income gradient that many previous studies interpret as being consistent with credit 
constraints.   
  We impose four sample restrictions to look at this hypothesis.  First, parents make no 
contributions for college (
p e = 0 );
48 second, parental income in 1996 exceeds $20,000 (in 
                                                 
47 Where both parents responded to the bequest question, we take the answer from the financial respondent for the 
household. 
48 Parental support for college (
p e ) is positive for a given college term when the respondent indicates that one or 
both of her parents provided financial assistance during that particular term (through 2004).  Respondents with  
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2004/05 dollars); third, all children in the sample have enrolled in at least one semester of school 
beyond high school; and fourth, no covariates or variables to select the sample are missing.  The 
first criterion is necessary to yield an unambiguous empirical hypothesis.
49  The second criterion 
is necessary because, below some threshold of income, the expected family contribution is zero.  
As long as institutions meet financial need through packages of grants and loans, parents with 
very low incomes would be expected to make no contribution to their children’s higher 
education, yet their children would not be borrowing constrained.  Twenty thousand dollars (in 
2004/05) is a conservative threshold below which the parent’s expected family contribution is 
$0.
50  The third criterion arises because we select the sample on the condition 
p e = 0.  It is 
trivially true that parents provide no payments for higher education when their children never 
attend college.  But these children may well not be intergenerationally constrained.  To examine 
the sharp hypothesis of a declining relationship between income and college completion, we 
want to focus on families that are intergenerationally constrained.  Descriptive statistics for the 
samples and details on the sample construction are given in Appendix Tables 4 and 5. 
  Table 7 reports the marginal effects from a Probit regression on college completion.  
Parental income is indeed negatively related to college completion for incomes up to $113,000, 
which includes 97 percent of the sample.  Evaluated at the means of continuous variables and 
modes of discrete variables, a $10,000 increase in income lowers the probability of college 
completion by 1.9 percentage points.  This marginally significant result is consistent with the 
existence of borrowing constraints for higher education.  The coefficients of other covariates 
                                                                                                                                                             
college experience whose parents do not provide assistance during any of the terms they are in college compose our 
sample of  0
p e =  students. 
49 The expected relationship between income and educational attainment in the  0
p e >  subsample is ambiguous.  
Financial aid will decrease with income, but parental gifts presumably increase with income.   
50 The guidelines state that the EFC should automatically be zero if gross income is under $15,000.  With exclusions 
and other provisions, there is clearly a discrepancy between our NLSY-97 income measure and “gross income” as 
required in EFC calculations.    
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have the expected signs, but only the coefficients of female (which is strongly, positively 
correlated with college completion), AFQT and student age are significant at usual levels of 
confidence.  
  The second test is based on the following idea:  Our theory and empirical work emphasize 
the importance of identifying the potentially constrained population, namely those parent-child 
pairs where the parents do not invest efficiently by meeting their EFC.  Up to this point we have 
followed the implications of the theory, distinguishing the constrained group by whether or not 
parents make post-schooling gifts.  An alternative we can pursue with the NLSY-97 is to impute 
the EFC directly and then observe whether parents paid it based on reported contributions. 
  The EFC is a function of many factors including parents’ income, assets, and family 
structure.  We expect the child’s years of education to decrease with ( )
p EFC e − .  There are two 
issues that arise with this alternative approach.  First, the factors that determine the EFC are 
complex (in recent years, for example, there were 28 distinct income and asset items that go into 
the EFC calculation).  So estimates of  n ()
p EFC e −  will likely be biased, since we do not have the 
information needed to accurately calculate EFC.  Second, credit constraints may also affect 
whether or not a child goes to college.  But we have no measure of 
p e  for a child who does not 
attend college.  Hence, the second new robustness test is not our preferred approach.    
  Nevertheless, we can use data from the NLSY-97 to construct an estimate of the parents’ 
EFC.  To do this, we incorporate the following assumptions.  First, we use 2001-02 academic 
year financial aid rules.  Over the relevant period covered in our data, there are few changes to 
the rules (beyond adjusting for inflation).  Second, we use parental financial information from 
1997 (in 2000 dollars), since these are the primary data collected by the NSLY-97 on parental 
resources.  Third, we use the income of the custodial parent’s household rather than the income  
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of the biological parents, in cases where the child does not live with his or her biological parents.  
We do not have information on the non-custodial parent’s resources, though the EFC 
calculations seek information on these.  Fourth, we impute tax liabilities making use of the 
NBER’s TAXSIM model (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993), which requires us to make assumptions 
about property taxes, mortgage interest, and state of residence, among other things.
51  Fifth, and 
perhaps most importantly, we assume the EFC calculation is based on the average cost of a child 
attending an in-state, four-year public university, while living at home.  The choice of college is 
clearly endogenous to the parents’ willingness to finance education.  Consequently, we believe 
the costs of college are conservatively proxied by the average in-state tuition and fees for 4-year 
public institutions.  The figure (in 2006 dollars) in academic year 2001/02 was $4,326 (College 
Board, 2006).   
  The key covariate in our empirical model of the highest grade completed is  n ()
p EFC e − .  As 
discussed above, the maximum EFC is capped at the in-state public college cost.  The minimum 
value of  n ()
p EFC e −  is set to zero:  parents who give larger gifts than our imputed EFC are 
simply considered to have met the full EFC, but not more.  Other covariates in the empirical 
model include parent income and its square, net worth, AFQT, number of siblings, and indicator 
variables for the child’s gender, race and ethnicity, child age, mother’s education, and whether 
the child lives in a single-parent household, in an urban area, or in the South.
52 
  Results for a specification focusing on highest grade completed are given in Table 8.  The 
key coefficient estimate is for  n ()
p EFC e − :  it is negative and significant at the one percent level.  
                                                 
51 We assume property taxes are $9 for every $1,000 of home value, mortgage interest is 6 percent of the 
outstanding mortgage balance, and the household is living in an unspecified state in TAXSIM, which results in the 
household receiving roughly average state income tax liabilities. 
52 This is a richer set of covariates than what is included in the central HRS-based specifications.  But the HRS-
based models include family-specific effects.  
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Its magnitude suggests that a child from a well-to-do family who is expected to meet the full cost 
of the in-state public university but who, for one reason or another, decides to give nothing, 
would get roughly 0.45 years less total schooling than an otherwise identical child whose family 
meets the full EFC.  This result is again consistent with borrowing constraints for education 
being an economically important phenomenon for a non-trivial portion of parent-child pairs.  
Fewer than half the families in the sample used in Table 8 meet their full EFC.  More than thirty 
percent of children in the sample have gaps exceeding $1,000 between estimated EFC and 
parents’ actual contributions.   
  The other covariates in the empirical model conform to expectations.  The highest grade 
completed is positively related to AFQT, being female, and being black, and negatively related 
to the number of siblings, being from a single-parent home and being younger at the time of the 
initial NLSY-97 interview.   
7.  Summing up 
  We develop an analytic model that tells us precisely how to approach the data to examine 
whether borrowing constraints affect education decisions.  The key issue is whether parents meet 
their expected family contribution.  Children whose parents do not will have a harder time 
financing college than children whose parents do.  Issues may arise with any single specification 
we examine.  But we have not been able to come up with a coherent alternative explanation to 
borrowing constraints for the empirical patterns we have documented.  Specifically, close birth 
spacing is a strong predictor of college financial aid.  Among the children of a parent who makes 
no post-schooling transfers, siblings with closer birth dates complete more education than their 
siblings with more isolated birth dates.  Birth spacing does not matter for families making post-
college transfers.  The effects are strongest for middle-wealth families who would be expected to  
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not receive complete financial aid or no financial aid.  The effects are larger during periods when 
more financial aid is available.  Similar results arise when the sample is split based on an 
experimental proxy for parental altruism:  Birth spacing has no effect on educational attainment 
of children with the most altruistic parents while spacing is significant for children with less 
altruistic parents.  Birth spacing does not matter for children whose parents expect to make 
substantial bequests.  It does for children whose parents do not.  Finally evidence from the 
NLSY-97 is consistent with the HRS-based evidence:  children in families whose parents do not 
meet their expected family contribution get less education than children from families that do.  
We think the evidence, taken together, supports the implications of the model where strategic 
concerns result in some parents investing less than the efficient level in their children’s 
education. 
IV.  Conclusions        
  A student’s federal assistance for college is determined based on their parents’ presumed 
ability to pay, and standards for financial independence from parents are stringent.  Parents are 
under no legal obligation to meet their expected contribution as specified in federal financial aid 
formulas.  If parents refuse to pay, children may face financial constraints in attending college.   
According to their parents, a third of all children in the Health and Retirement Study who got 
some post-secondary education did so without their parents’ financial assistance.  This fact is not 
solely a consequence of need-based financial aid differences.  A quarter of children whose 
parents held $200,000-$400,000 in net worth in 2000 attended college without parental support, 
as did 16 percent of those whose parents’ net worth exceeded $400,000.  The scope for some 
students having financial difficulty in attending college appears quantitatively important. 
  Given this fact, we present a theory of efficient human capital investment, focusing on the  
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roles of parent and child decisions and financial aid.  The theory implies that financial aid 
increases the educational attainment of intergenerationally constrained children who receive no 
post-schooling gifts from their parents, but financial aid does not matter to the attainment of 
intergenerationally unconstrained children. These effects each rely on an asymmetry in the 
access of parents and their college-aged children to credit. 
  Estimates using data from the HRS support the model’s predictions.  Based on an 
idiosyncrasy in the dependence of U.S. financial aid on the number of children a parent has in 
college, we use years of overlap with college-age siblings as a proxy for financial aid.  We find 
the educational attainment of children whose parents are not observed to make post-schooling 
cash gifts is affected by financial aid.  The educational attainment of children whose parents do 
make gifts is not affected by financial aid.  These results, along with a series of specification and 
robustness tests, suggest that parents can relieve educational borrowing constraints for their 
children, but that they do not always choose to do so.   
  Our empirical estimates are economically significant.  The Table 2 point estimates imply 
that a twin with no other siblings in a family that does not make post-college transfers will 
complete, on average, 0.4 years more schooling than an only child, all else equal.  This twin 
would receive roughly $3,600 (in 2009 dollars) more financial aid than an otherwise identical 
student with their nearest sibling spaced five or more years apart (or without a sibling).  It is 
impossible, however, to target aid to just those children whose parents do not make post-college 
transfers.  Because about half the sample are children whose parents do not make post-college 
transfers, our estimates imply that $3,600 in aid would generate, on average, 0.2 additional years 
of schooling.  Using the simple, suggestive calculations described in the text, the return to this 
investment is around 17 percent.    
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  A large, insightful prior literature documents empirical relationships that authors interpret as 
being consistent with educational borrowing constraints (see, for example, Manski and Wise, 
1983; Hauser, 1993; Kane, 1994; Card, 1999; Kane and Rouse, 1999; Ellwood and Kane, 2000; 
Keane and Wolpin, 2001; Rothstein and Rouse, 2007; and, at least in data from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1997 cohort, Belley and Lochner, 2007).  The same can be said 
for the papers that argue that U.S. educational credit markets are nearly complete by Cameron 
and Heckman (1998, 2001), Shea (2000), Carneiro and Heckman (2002), Cameron and Taber 
(2004), and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008).
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  None of these papers, however, model explicitly how the interactions between parents and 
children may rationally lead to credit constraints for college.  Carneiro and Heckman (2003), for 
example, describe a model of human capital investment that is used to motivate their empirical 
analysis.  They write “The agent possesses exogenous income flows in each period,  0 Y  and  1 Y .  
One can think of  0 Y  as parental income” (p. 1000).  They then derive empirical predictions on 
the importance of parental income on schooling attainment and infer the significance of 
borrowing constraints from their estimates.  Our analysis suggests that such an interpretation 
may be misguided.  In a richer model of parent-child behavior, one needs to carefully distinguish 
intergenerational borrowing constraints from life-cycle borrowing constraints.  The lack of 
relationship between children’s schooling and parental resources may reflect the fact that the 
parent is unwilling to fully support the child’s college aspirations, so the child does not have full 
access to parental income.  This would occur if parents perceive themselves to be poor relative to 
their children or the parent is not particularly altruistic.  In this case, the parent’s income is not a 
relevant state variable for the child’s decision problem and an empirical finding of the lack of 
                                                 
53 Carneiro and Heckman (2002) find that up to 8 percent of the relevant U.S. population may be short-run credit 
constrained.  
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dependence of parent’s income on child schooling does not help identify borrowing constraints.  
  In general, our framework suggests that research strategies that attempt to investigate the 
importance of credit constraints by examining the income gradient of college attendance or of 
educational attainment will be difficult to interpret.  In our model, holding all else equal, 
educational attainment will vary inversely with parental resources for those intergenerationally 
constrained families where parents contribute nothing to their children’s education.  The 
explanation comes directly from financial aid rules.  As parents’ resources increase, the expected 
family contribution (EFC) increases.  If children have parents who refuse or are unable to meet 
the EFC, the larger the unmet EFC, the more difficulty the child will have in financing college.  
For low-income families who get full financial aid, educational attainment will be non-
decreasing with parental resources.  Of course other factors, some likely unobserved, may lead to 
a positive correlation between parental income and educational attainment.  The relationship 
between parental income and their children’s educational attainment will be difficult to interpret 
in empirical studies that mix families willing to meet and unwilling to meet their expected family 
contribution  
  Two features of the economic environment we construct cause students to have difficulties 
in financing their education when parents, for one reason or another, are unwilling or unable to 
make the expected family contribution.  First, parents and children are unable to write binding 
contracts.  Second, students cannot borrow against their future human capital.  It is difficult to 
imagine changing rules governing parent-child contracts in ways that are useful for alleviating 
credit constraints without also having more important undesirable consequences.  It may be 
possible to relax restrictions students face on borrowing, particularly in cases where parents are 
unwilling (or unable) to cosign loans.  Increases in financial aid for children whose parents are  
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unwilling to meet their expected family contribution would increase educational attainment.  At 
the same time, greater financial aid would likely reduce contributions made by families currently 
meeting (or exceeding) their expected family contribution.  So policy-makers will need to 
grapple with this tradeoff – providing marginal subsidies for borrowing constrained students 
against infra-marginal subsidies to families willing to support their children’s educational goals.  
Our evidence suggests that financial aid increases can increase educational attainment, though 
clearly at a cost that exceeds a perfectly targeted policy. 
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Appendix A:  Proofs 
Constraints  0 and  0
kk ae ≥≥  both bind for the child if the parent chooses  1 ,   and 
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Lemma 1: If  2 0 g >  in equilibrium, then it must be the case that  0
k a = . 
 
The intuition behind lemma 1 is that, since both the parent and the child earn return R on 
physical capital investment, the parent who anticipates a positive second period gift will always 
prefer to save for the child. A formal proof of lemma 1 is available from the authors. 
 
Lemma 2:   In the first period, the parent can do no better than to choose  1 (, ,)
pp gae  to 
maximize {( ) } 12 1 2 () () () ()
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We find that the parent can replicate the consumption paths of any such equilibrium by deviating 
from the equilibrium in period 1 to choose first period transfer  11
kk ggae = −−  , savings 

p pk aaa =+  and human capital investment 
p pk eee = +  .  In the deviation, constraints  0
k e ≥  
and 0
k a ≥  bind for the child. This implies that the parent can replicate any feasible consumption 
path by choosing  1 (, ,)
pp gae  in the first period such that  0
k e ≥  and  0
k a ≥  bind. Therefore the 
parent can do no better than to choose his or her most preferred period 1  1 (, ,)
pp gae subject to 
0
k e ≥  and  0
k a ≥  binding for the child. A formal proof of lemma 2 is available from the 
authors. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
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Recall that the requirement that condition (7) holds is equivalent to the requirement that  0
k e ≥  
and  0
k a ≥  bind. Suppose that the parent is permitted to choose  2 g  such that 
22 () ( ( ( , ) ) )
pp uR a g uh e e g ατ ′′ −= +, even if this implies  2 0 g < . Without imposing (7), the 
parent’s choice of  1 (, ,)
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and therefore (7) is satisfied at the parent’s preferred feasible  1 (, ,)
pp gae . Conditions (9) are met 
by a unique set of consumption levels  12 1 1 2 {,, ,}
ppk k ccc g c = . If conditions (9) can be met with 
2 0 g ≥ , then these consumption levels result from the parent’s optimal actions given his or her 
resource constraints and the choices available to the child. 
 
However, it is possible that conditions (9) cannot be met with  2 0 g ≥ . Where  2 0 g ≥  binds for 
the parent, the solution to (8) is such that
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so that again (7) need not be imposed. Like conditions (9), conditions (10) are satisfied by a 
unique set of consumption levels  12 1 1 2 {,, ,}
ppk k ccc g c = . In either case, Lemma 2 implies that the 
parent’s lifetime welfare at this consumption vector,  ( ) 12 12 () () () ()
pp kk uc uc uc uc βα β ++ + , 
represents the maximum equilibrium welfare available to the parent given the resource 
constraints and the child’s available choices. The uniqueness of the consumption levels that solve 
(8) implies that no other set of feasible consumption levels yields higher welfare for the parent,  
 53
and therefore  12 12 {,,,}
ppkk cccc represents the family’s unique equilibrium consumption, 
completing the proof of (i). 
 
We know, based on (9) and (10), that  12 12 {,,,}
ppkk cccc can be generated by only one set of parental 
choices  12 {, , , }
pp gae g  at which  0 and  0
kk ea ≥≥  bind. It may still be the case, however, that 
this same consumption path can be supported by different transfers and investments where 
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p e  
through  1 g , expecting the child to save for herself or invest in her own education. 
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Thus whenever  2(0) 0 g > , the parent and the child disagree on the child’s optimal intertemporal 
consumption path. Allowing the child to save independently or invest in her own education will 
lead to consumption other than 12 12 { (0), (0), (0), (0)}
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Since the above agrees with the intertemporal condition on the child’s consumption in (10), we 
see that the parent’s reallocation of  (0, (0)
p ee ε ⎤ ∈ − ⎦ from 
p e  to 1 g  results in the same 
equilibrium 12 12 { (0), (0), (0), (0)}
ppkk cccc. Finally, condition (2) and the definition of e together  
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indicate that where p reallocates  ( (0) , (0)
pp ee e ε ⎤ ∈− ⎦  from 
p e  to 1 g  the child’s educational 
investment may or may not be such that conditions (10) hold. Therefore where  2(0) 0 g =  there 
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Proof of Proposition 2:   Proof of the first two claims in part 1 of the proposition, which assume  
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 > 0, proving the first claim. 
(Note that the net rate of return on educational investment is  '( )(1 ) he τ + . As long as the 
primitive parameters of the problem are such that  2 0 g >  in equilibrium, a change in τ  does not 
change the return to the marginal human capital investment realized by the family.) 
 Turning  to  the  2 0 g =  case, given that the parent and child agree on the child’s 





p k c hc pp k
R xcc τ
−
+ ≥++ + . (11) 
As τ  increases, the parent’s effective budget constraint shifts out. As the parent’s budget 
increases, he or she is only able to meet both (11) and the marginal conditions in (4) with an 
investment profile { , }
p ae  such that the rate of return gap,  '( )(1 ) he R τ + − , decreases, 
approaching the unconstrained equilibrium.
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54 Lengthy details on the behavior of conditions (4) as τ  increases are available from the authors.  
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as claimed in the second part of the first proposition. The proposition implies that, as long as the 
primitive parameters of the problem are such that  2 0 g =  in equilibrium, the equilibrium net 
return to the marginal educational investment decreases with financial aid. 
 
Proof of the two claims in the second part of the proposition, which assume 
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educational investment is invariant to the child’s financial aid, completing the proof of the first 
claim. 
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in the  2 0 g =  equilibrium, completing the proof of the second claim in the second part of the 
proposition.  
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Appendix B:  An Economic Environment with Greater Realism 
 
In this appendix we extend the baseline model, allowing uncertain earnings and the child to 
borrow at a higher interest rate than the parent, and we explicitly model the human capital 
production function of the child, which allows us to model a child’s decision to work while in 
college.  We show the central result from our simple model in the text holds:  financial aid will 
have a larger effect on the educational attainment of children from families that do not make 
financial transfers in the second period ( 2 0 g =  families) compared to children from families that 
do make second period transfers ( 2 0 g >  families).  Since we now consider a stochastic version 
of the model, we can no longer say that all children in the  2 0 g =  sample will be constrained in 
their human capital investment decisions. Instead, we show these children are significantly more 
likely to under-invest in their human capital than children in the  2 0 g >  sample. 
 
We start by assuming the child faces uncertainty in future earnings. The child solves  
 
{ } 11 22 max ( , ) ( , ) ( ) , β θ +Θ ∫
kk kk uc l uc l d  
subject to  
11 1 (1 ), ++=+ − −
kkk kk caegwln 
and 
22 2 () ( 1 ) (, ) , θτ =+ − + + +
kk k k p k cR a wl h n ee g  
where the function R  is given by 
, if  0
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We assume that the rate at which children can borrow  ' R  exceeds the market rate of return R . 
 
In the above formulation, l stands for leisure, n denotes time spent in college, w stands for the 
wage rate, and θ  denotes uncertainty in labor earnings. While the child experiences the same 
rate of return to savings, R , as does the parent, the cost of borrowing against his or her own 
future earnings is higher and is denoted by ' R .  We assume that the distribution from which 
shocks are drawn is the same for all levels of human capital.
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The parent cares about the child, so the parent’s decision problem is given by 
 
 
{ } 1 2 11 22 m a x ( )( ) ( , ) ( , )( ) α βθ ⎡ ⎤ ++ + Θ ∫ ⎣ ⎦
pp k k k k vc vc uc l uc l d  
 
                                                 
55 If we assumed highly educated households face less uncertainty about their future earnings, we would be more 
likely to find that parents who do not follow up with post-schooling gifts under-invest in their children’s education.  
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subject to  
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The model is now substantially more complicated than before – there are many more choice 
variables, and uncertainty in earnings breaks the one-for-one link between efficient investment in 
human capital and second period cash gifts. Hence, this economic environment needs to be 











− − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ =
−
cl
ucl  where 0 1 η <<  determines the relative taste for consumption versus 
leisure.  Cobb-Douglas preferences are widely used in the macro literature, since they are 
consistent with balanced growth, irrespective of the choice for θ .  Moreover, this specification 
implies non-separability between consumption and leisure, which is consistent with some 
microeconomic empirical evidence (for example, Heckman, 1974).  The parameter η  can be 
identified by the share of disposable time people devote to market work.  A typical value for η  is 
1
3
.   Our preferences imply that the parameter θ  governs both the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution for consumption and the corresponding elasticity for hours worked.  In particular, 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption is 
1
θ
.  A standard value for θ  is 4.  
The coefficient of relative risk aversion is then 1 η ηθ − + .  Our parameters imply a risk aversion 
coefficient of 2 and a Frisch labor supply elasticity of 1.  We experiment with η  between 0.1 and 
0.5 and θ  between 1 and 6.  These cover the range of available estimates for the labor supply 
elasticity and risk aversion.  
 
Our human capital production function is parameterized as  12 (,)
γ γ = hne z n e . Time and goods 
inputs are combined with ability, z , to produce human capital.  This specification follows the 
pioneering work of Ben Porath (1967).  There are numerous papers that estimate the parameters 
1 γ  and  2 γ .  A prominent set of estimates suggest that the returns to scale in the human capital 
production function,  12 γ γγ = +  are 0.9 or higher (see Browning, Hansen and Heckman, 1999).
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In our baseline parameterization we assume that  0.9 γ =  and  2 0.3 γ = .  Finally, we assume that 
R equals 5 percent while  ' R  equals 10 percent. Here, we have in mind uncollateralized loans 
such as credit card loans that typically come with an interest rate well above 10 percent.  Higher 
values of  ' R  would make our results stronger. 
                                                 
56If  2 0 γ = , expenditures do not affect human capital production  
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The distribution of earnings after college is the result of two underlying sources of heterogeneity. 
First, children are different on the basis of their ability before college.  This reflects both innate 
differences in children as well as differences in acquired human capital before college.  Second, 
earnings are also affected by luck shocks that the child realizes after completing college.  Two 
moments are used to parameterize the two distributions – the distribution of schooling and the 




As we have noted several times, uncertainty breaks the tight link between the optimality (from 
the child’s perspective) of first period education transfers and second period financial transfers.  
Given this, our strategy is to split the sample into those who do give gifts and those who do not 
and then examine whether families who do not pass on gifts are more likely to under-invest.  
 
In the baseline specification of preferences, we find that 69 percent of families who do not pass 
on gifts in the second period, under-invest in college education.  In contrast, only 17 percent of 
families who do end up with positive post-schooling cash transfers under-invest in their 
children’s education.  
 
It is instructive to examine the implications of two assumptions – the possibility of borrowing 
while in college and work while in college. If we assume that work while in college is not 
possible and that the child cannot borrow against future income, then the fraction of households 
(with zero gifts) that under-invest increases to 87 percent from 69 percent. This suggests that 
while both these options relieve borrowing constraints, a substantial fraction of parents who do 
not give gifts still have children who are unable to get the efficient level of education, even when 
work and high-cost borrowing are available. As mentioned earlier, we also experiment with a 
range of parameter values, allowing η  to vary between 0.1 and 0.5 and θ  to vary between 1 and 
6.  Then the fraction of households with zero gifts that under-invests ranges from 59 percent to 
91 percent depending on parameter values, and this fraction is always substantially higher than 
the group that does give gifts. 
 
These results add to our confidence that the main implications of our simple model stand up to 
further scrutiny.  This is perhaps not all that surprising since the results depend on 
straightforward assumptions – parents are altruistic, children cannot borrow against future human 
capital, parents and children cannot write binding contracts, and human capital production is 
subject to diminishing returns.  The assumptions (along with optimizing behavior) will lead 
parents to equate the marginal return to investing in education to the real financial market rate of 
return. Parents who get to this margin will then give post-college gifts.  Parents who do not, will 
be significantly less likely to give post-college gifts. Variable Sample Sample size Mean Median Standard deviation
Parent made any gift to children, 1998-2004 1998-2004 Cores 34,593 0.4888 0.0000 0.50
Parent ever made major gift to child 1994 Module 1262 0.3700 0.0000 0.4988
Parent's 2000 household income 2000 Core 34,593 $42,155 $25,588 $64,439
1994 Module 1262 $48,975 $35,000 $49,734
Parent's 2000 household net worth 2000 Core 34,593 $299,689 $111,000 $799,255
1994 Module 1262 $309,531 $149,950 $571,914
Child years of education 2000 Core 34,593 13.80 13.00 6.875
1994 Module 1262 13.30 12.00 2.194
Child gender (male = 1) 2000 Core 34,593 0.5004 1.0000 0.5000
1994 Module 1262 0.4857 0.0000 0.5000
Child age in 2000 2000 Core 34,593 41.82 41.00 9.64
1994 Module 1262 40.73 41.00 6.45
Oldest child indicator 2000 Core 34,593 0.2856 0.0000 0.4517
1994 Module 1262 0.2647 0.0000 0.4413
Youngest child indicator 2000 Core 34,593 0.2617 0.0000 0.4395
1994 Module 1262 0.2361 0.0000 0.4249
Years of overlap with siblings' college ages 2000 Core 34,593 2.337 2.000 2.130
1994 Module 1262 2.631 2.000 2.141
Note: Sample children are aged 24 and older.
Table 1:  Child-Level Descriptive Statistics for the Health and Retirement Study SamplesTable 2: Family Fixed Effect Estimates of Years of Schooling, HRS, Gift v. No Gift
Gifts No Gifts Gifts No Gifts
Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter
Independent variable (Std error) (Std error) (Std error) (Std error)
Child gender, male=1 -0.242*** -0.086 -0.249 -0.314**
(0.087) (0.088) (0.195) (0.134)
Child age -0.014 -0.048*** -0.008 -0.051***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.029) (0.018)
Oldest child indicator 0.147 0.296** 0.079 0.290
(0.117) (0.121) (0.258) (0.186)
Youngest child indicator 0.119 -0.089 0.187 -0.056
(0.124) (0.126) (0.265) (0.194)
Sibling-years of overlap 0.034 0.105*** -0.050 0.094**
in college ages (0.031) (0.030) (0.064) (0.046)
Number of Children 16,892 17,701 467 795
Number of Families 4890 4581 125 209
R-squared 0.5934 0.6521 0.5713 0.5941
Adjusted R-squared 0.4276 0.5304 0.4073 0.4454
* indicates significance at the 10 percent, ** at the 5 percent, and *** at the 1 percent level. 
1998-2004 Gifts to Children Transfer Module Gifts to ChildrenTable 3: Family Fixed Effect Estimates of Years of Schooling, HRS
1998-2004 Gifts to Children
Gifts No Gifts Gifts No Gifts
Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter
Independent variable (Std error) (Std error) (Std error) (Std error)
Child gender, male=1 -0.241** -0.088 -0.341 -0.379*
(0.0878) (0.089) (0.0204) (0.153)
Child age 0.014 -0.048** -0.014 -0.067**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.029) (0.023)
Oldest child indicator 0.145 0.297* 0.094 0.331
(0.117) (0.121) (0.273) (0.216)
Youngest child indicator 0.119 -0.089 0.547 -0.274
(0.125) (0.127) (0.286) (0.224)
Sibling-years of overlap 0.020 0.070 0.048 0.071
in college ages*Tercile 1 (0.045) (0.046) (0.103) (0.063)
Sibling-years of overlap 0.048 0.189** 0.060 0.197*
in college ages*Tercile 2 (0.051) (0.047) (0.083) (0.082)
Sibling-years of overlap 0.040 0.046 -0.044 -0.047
in college ages*Tercile 3 (0.055) (0.054) (0.128) (0.114)
Number of Children 16,824 17,609 364 582
Number of Families 4869 4557 92 150
R-squared 0.59 0.65 0.59 0.57
Adjusted R-squared 0.43 0.53 0.44 0.41
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Transfer Module Gifts to ChildrenTable 4: Family Fixed Effect Estimates of Years of Schooling, HRS, Around Reform
College Entry
1998-2004 Gifts to Children Gifts No Gifts Gifts No Gifts
Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter
Independent variable (Std Error) (Std Error) (Std Error) (Std Error)
Child gender, male=1 -0.0707 -0.146 -0.443** -0.0104
(0.113) (0.121) (0.142) (0.157)
Child age 0.00553 -0.0610** -0.00152 -0.0211
(0.0191) (0.0182) (0.0296) (0.0327)
Oldest child indicator 0.128 0.338* 0.204 0.229
(0.145) (0.159) (0.201) (0.242)
Youngest child indicator 0.0184 -0.164 0.258 0.0487
(0.172) (0.187) (0.196) (0.215)
Sibling-years of overlap -0.231** 0.239** 0.111 -0.0145
in college ages*Tercile 1 (0.0688) (0.0684) (0.0656) (0.0829)
Sibling-years of overlap 0.0710 0.143* 0.0403 0.284**
in college ages*Tercile 2 (0.0716) (0.0670) (0.0828) (0.0874)
Sibling-years of overlap -0.0296 0.0692 0.114 0.0533
in college ages*Tercile 3 (0.0745) (0.0758) (0.0929) (0.0974)
Number of Children 8180 11,036 8712 6636
Number of Families 3133 3579 3416 2623
R-squared 0.7339 0.6559 0.6248 0.7327
Adjusted R-squared 0.5682 0.4903 0.3821 0.5572
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Post-reform Pre-reformTable 5: Family Fixed Effect Estimates of Years of Schooling,
 HRS 2000 Economic Altruism Module
Altruism Module
Parameter
Independent variable (Std error)




Oldest child indicator 0.581*
(0.276)
Youngest child indicator 0.134
(0.286)
Sibling-years of overlap 0.0982
in college ages*Give 3/4 (0.0894)
Sibling-years of overlap 0.644**
in college ages*Give 1/2 (0.109)
Sibling-years of overlap 0.398*
in college ages*Never give (0.157)
Number of Children 3292
Number of Families 914
R-squared 0.3035
Adjusted R-squared 0.0332
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Table 6: Family Fixed Effect Estimates of Years of Schooling,
 Bequest Measures from HRS 1994 Economic Altruism Module & HRS 2000 Core
Altruism Module HRS 2000 Core
Parameter Parameter
Independent variable (Std error) (Std error)
Child gender, male=1 -0.0801 -0.196**
(0.247) (0.0755)
Child age -0.0738* -0.0127
(0.0367) (0.0111)
Oldest child indicator 0.224 0.299**
(0.335) (0.102)
Youngest child indicator -0.0123 0.600
(0.354) (0.107)
Sibling-years of overlap 0.0552 --
in college ages*bequest (0.165)
very important
Sibling-years of overlap 0.186** --
in college ages*bequest (0.0868)
somewhat or not at all
important
Sibling-years of overlap -- 0.0466
in college ages*100,000 (0.0347)
bequest Pr >= 50%
Sibling-years of overlap -- 0.109**
in college ages*100,000 (0.0336)
bequest Pr < 50%
Number of Children 3292 23,326
Number of Families 568 7628
R-squared 0.3035 0.5458
Adjusted R-squared 0.0332 0.3248
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Independent variable Parameter (SE)
Parent's 1997 income, 1000s -0.002* (0.001)
Parent's 1997 income squared, 10000s 0.001** (0.000)
AFQT percentile 0.002*** (0.000)
Mother's education <HS 0.022 (0.038)
Mother HS grad -0.010 (0.023)




Broken home -0.024 (0.022)
Urban -0.045 (0.029)
South -0.009 (0.023)
12 years old in 1997 wave -0.115*** (0.019)
13 years old in 1997 wave -0.072*** (0.021)
14 years old in 1997 wave -0.032 (0.024)
15 years old in 1997 wave -0.012 (0.027)
Observations 511
Pseudo R-squared 0.176
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7:  Probit Estimates (Marginal Effects) of College Completion, NLSY-97
Respondents Whose Parent(s) 
Don't Pay for College, EFC>0 Parameter
Independent variable (Std error)
Parent's 1997 income, 1000s 0.010***
(0.002)
Parent's 1997 income squared, 10000s -0.003***
(0.001)




Mother's education <HS -0.051
(0.129)
Mother HS grad -0.076
(0.080)














12 years old in 1997 wave -1.377***
(0.123)
13 years old in 1997 wave -0.984***
(0.126)
14 years old in 1997 wave -0.243*
(0.131)
15 years old in 1997 wave -0.049
(0.145)






* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8:  OLS Estimates of Highest Grade Completed, NLSY-97Appendix Table 1: HRS Sample Construction
Full HRS 2000 sample, with 1998-2004 gift data
Initial number of households 13,091
Number of children of these households 40,667
Of these, children with complete age and education data 37,875
Of these, children aged 24 and over 36,353
Of these, children with complete gender and relationship data 36,351
Of these, children with at least 1 sibling 34,610
Of these, have 1998-2004 gift data 34,593
Number of families represented by remaining children 9,471
HRS Wave 2 Module 7 sample
Initial number of module respondents 827
Number of families represented by the respondents 427
Number of children in the above families 1542
Of these, children with complete age data on all siblings 1536
Of these, children who are 24 and older 1458
Of these, children with gift data 1444
Of these, children with complete education, gender and relationship 1362
Of these, children with at least 1 sibling 1262
Number of families represented by remaining children 334Parameter
Independent variable (Std error)
Sibling-years of overlap in first term of college 367.19**
(186.97)
Parent's 1997 income, 1000s -23.66***
(6.36)
Parent's 1997 income squared, 10000s 6.88***
(2.33)
Parent's 1997 net worth, 1000s -2.34**
(0.91)










* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Appendix Table 2:  OLS Estimates of Financial Aid, NLSY-97Parameter
Independent variable (Std error)
Sibling-years of overlap in college ages -0.51**
(0.22)
Mother's education <HS -18.13***
(1.09)
Mother HS grad -9.51***
(0.86)
Parent's 1997 income, 1000s 0.24***
(0.02)




























* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Appendix Table 3:  OLS Estimates of AFQT percentile, NLSY-97Variable Name Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Completed college 0.11 0.00 0.32 ** ** **
Highest grade completed ** ** ** 14.14 14.00 1.43
Parent's 1997 income, 1000s 48.02 42.00 30.88 60.50 52.00 46.59
Parent's 1997 net worth, 1000s ** ** ** 193.09 75.05 450.09
AFQT percentile 53.56 53.71 25.43 60.94 64.65 26.25
Mother's education <HS 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.10 0.00 0.31
Mother HS grad 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.32 0.00 0.47
Mother some college 0.46 0.00 0.50 0.57 1.00 0.50
Number of siblings 2.30 2.00 1.56 2.06 2.00 1.52
Female 0.53 1.00 0.50 0.56 1.00 0.50
Black 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.19 0.00 0.40
Hispanic 0.18 0.00 0.38 0.15 0.00 0.35
Broken home 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.39 0.00 0.49
Urban 0.72 1.00 0.45 0.73 1.00 0.44
South 0.34 0.00 0.47 0.34 0.00 0.47
12 years old in 1997 wave 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.21 0.00 0.41
13 years old in 1997 wave 0.21 0.00 0.40 0.25 0.00 0.43
14 years old in 1997 wave 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.21 0.00 0.41
15 years old in 1997 wave 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.17 0.00 0.38
16 years old in 1997 wave 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.16 0.00 0.36
Funding gap in first term of college, 100s ** ** ** 6.25 1.94 7.35
Appendix Table 4:  Descriptive Statistics for the NLSY-97 Estimation Samples
Respondents Whose Parent(s) Don't Pay for 
College, EFC>0 (511 observations)
Respondents Who Enroll in at Least One 
Term of College (1,318 observations)Appendix Table 5: NLSY Sample Construction
Respondents Whose Parent(s) Don't Pay for College, EFC>0 
Initial number of respondents 8,984
Of these, respondents with non-missing college completion data  in 2004 7,383
Of these, respondents with at least one term of college experience as of 2004 4,241
Of these, respondents with non-missing parental income data from 1997 3,159
Of these, respondents whose have families have EFC>0 2,709
Of these, respondents whose parents do not pay for college 661
Of these, respondents with non-missing AFQT score 574
Of these, respondents with non-missing mother's education data 547
Of these, respondents with non-missing number of siblings data 529
Of these, respondents with non-missing urban/rural residence data 511
Respondents Who Enroll in at Least One Term of College
Initial number of respondents 8,984
Of these, respondents with non-missing college enrollment data  in 2004 7,440
Of these, respondents with at least one term of college experience as of 2004 4,263
Of these, respondents for whom EFC in first college term can be imputed 1,912
Of these, respondents with non-missing parental transfers data 1,721
Of these, respondents with non-missing parental net worth data from 1997 1,639
Of these, respondents with non-missing AFQT score 1,423
Of these, respondents with non-missing mother's education data 1,371
Of these, respondents with non-missing number of siblings data 1,369
Of these, respondents with non-missing urban/rural residence data 1,318